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I. DIVERGENT ANALYSES EMBODIED IN AVAILABLE AUTHORITIES
In the recent case of Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasing
Co.' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the radio station
operator who had used due care was not liable for a defamatory interpo-
lation by an outside speaker on a commercial program in which was
being broadcast a manuscript whose contents were free from objection.
In giving its reasons for this position the Pennsylvania Court
asserted that Pennsylvania law of defamation, unlike that of various
other jurisdictions, does not involve absolute liability but only a high
standard of care.2  On that one fundamental ground, therefore, this
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I. 8 A. (2d) 302 (Pa. 1939). For opinion in the trial court see 87 PTrrsBUaH
LEG. J. 49 (1939).
2. "A close examination of the Pennsylvania law will show that our rule is not
one of absolute liability, but rather, of a very strict standard of care to ascertain
the truth of the published matter." Kephart, C. J., in Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 307 (Pa. 1939). The court in a footnote sets out
in support of this statement certain quotations from the earlier cases of Clark v. North
American Co., 203 Pa. 346, 53 At. 237 (19o2) and Shelly v. Dampman, I Pa. Super.
I15 (1896). The court nowhere deals with the suggestions that so far as the Clark
case is concerned these quoted expressions grew out of a misconstruction of the lan-
guage in the Shelly case, confusing the basis for liability with abuse of privilege, that
they were mere obiter dicta, and that Justice Holmes in the Supreme Court of the
United States had included the Clark case among the authorities cited on the proposi-
tion that "Whatever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril." See Peck v. Tribune
Co., 214 U. S. x85, I89 (igog). So far as the Shelly case is concerned, even the ex-
cerpt quoted by Judge Kephart shows it was directed to the question of abuse of privi-
lege by failure to use due care, and in nowise supports the proposition that liability for
unprivileged defamation rests on failure to use due care. Indeed the opinion in the
Shelly case itself shows the exact contrary. "It needs no argument or citation of author-
ities to show that the only way to justify or excuse such a publication would be to
prove its truth." Shelly v. Dampman, I Pa. Super. 115, 124 (1896).
(249)
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:ase is at once sharply distinguishable from the case of Sorensen v.
Wood,3 the original case on defamation by radio. In that case the
Supreme Court of Nebraska, a state where the law of defamation
involves absolute liability,4 held that the radio station operator was
liable for defamatory utterances in a manuscript 5 read into the micro-
phone by a paying outside speaker. The two cases are of course also
readily distinguishable on their facts, in that the Pennsylvania case
dealt with an impromptu interpolation by an outside speaker while the
Nebraska case dealt with the broadcast of a defamatory manuscript
read by an outside speaker into the microphone.
Furthermore, in their approach to the problem of defamation by
radio, the opinions in these two cases differ widely. The case of Soren-
sen v. Wood treats the station operator as a joint publisher 6 with the
speaker at the microphone. It holds, accordingly, that the law of def-
amation is applicable to the radio station as well as to the speaker at
the microphone.7  In applying the law of defamation to the broadcast-
ing station it regards publication by newspaper and by radio as closely
analogous.8 On the other hand, the case of Summit Hotel Co. v.
3. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932), 82 A. L. R. iio6 (1933).
4. In the course of the opinion in Sorensen v. Wood, id. at 356, 243 N. W. 82, 86
(1932), the court quoted from Justice Holmes in Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. z85,
189 (igog), as follows: "If the publication was libelous, the defendant took the risk.
As was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whenever a man publishes, he pub-
lishes at his peril."' The court also referred to its earlier opinion in Walker v. Bee-
News Publishing Co., i22 Neb. 51, 240 N. W. 579 (1932), wherein it had reviewed
the authorities on this point and expressed its adherence to the views expressed by
Justice Holmes, and had referred to them as identical with the views expressed by
Lord Alverstone, C. J., in the leading English case of Jones v. Hulton, [i9o9] 2 K. B.
444, which was later affirmed on appeal to the House of Lords, [i91O] A. C. 20 (espe-
cially well expressed in the opinion by Lord Loreburn, L. C.). That this was not a
new position for the Supreme Court of Nebraska readily appears, furthermore, from
the much earlier case of Barr v. Birkner, 44 Neb. z97, 62 N. W. 494 (1895), wherein
substantially the same position was taken.
S. The language of the opinion in Sorensen v. Wood was regarded by Professor
Bohlen as obscure on the point of whether the manuscript was available to the broad-
casting company for supervision. i4 PRoc. A. L. I. 74 (937). Answering this sug-
gestion Chief Justice Goss, the writer of the opinion, stated before the American Law
Institute that it was. Id. at 82. The present writer has read through the record of
testimony in that case as it appeared in the bill of exceptions. From such reading it
is very clear that the manuscript containing the defamatory utterances was available
for the broadcasting company's supervision but that it was not asked for nor examined,
the company's employees taking the attitude that since it was a political address its
content was none of their concern. Identical copies of that manuscript had also been
delivered by the speaker to several newspapers, none of which had ventured to use it,
recognizing its defamatory character.
6. "The publication of a libel by radio to listeners over the air requires the partici-
pation of both the speaker and the owner of the broadcasting station. The publication
to such listeners is not completed until the material is broadcasted. As they must co-
operate to effect the publication of the libel there cannot be said to be a misjoinder
when they are sued together for damages resulting from their acts." Sorensen v. Wood,
123 Neb. 348, 357, 243 N. W. 82, 86 (0932).
7. "The underlying basis for liability is libel, and not negligent conduct." Id. at
353, 243 N. W. at 85.
8. "It has often been held in newspaper publication, which is closely analogous to
publication by radio, that due care and honest mistake do not relieve a publisher from
liability for libel." Id. at 356, 243 N. W. at 86.
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National Broadcasting Co. does not commit itself as to whether or not
the radio station operator is under any circumstances to be regarded as
a publisher but asserts that the newspaper analogy is inapplicable to
radio stations, at least as to impromptu interpolations.9 The two cases
present sharp contrasts, too, as to their underlying bases of rationaliza-
tion. Sorensen v. Wood recognizes as a matter of course that the law
of defamation involves absolute liability in cases of unprivileged pub-
lication of defamatory utterances. Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co. not only asserts that the law of defamation as recog-
nized in Pennsylvania involves merely a high standard of care, but
also asserts in effect that the general rule in tort law is that there is no
liability without fault,10 and intimates that even legislative enactment
cannot introduce absolute liability without violating constitutional due
9. "But where the circumstances, like those now presented, are such that the
defamation occurs beyond the control of the broadcaster, it is perfectly clear that the
analogy between newspapers and broadcasting companies collapses completely." Sum-
mit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 309 (Pa. 1939).
1o. "The case of injuries to land may now be said to be the general exception to
the modem rule that liability will not be predicated on innocent and diligent conduct.
A tort today implies fault or wrong. Tort liability must be founded upon some blame-
worthy conduct, or lack of due care resulting in the violation of a duty owing to others
. . . When considering the field of personal injuries there appears no valid exception
to the rule that liability can be based only upon intentional wrongdoing or lack of due
care." Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 304,s305 (Pa. 1939).
How preposterous this pronouncement is as a statement of tort law is neatly brought
out in the following excerpt from one of the greatest living American jurists. "It is a
practical question of the first importance, as well as a theoretical question of interest,
whether we are to generalize our whole system of tort liability by means of one prin-
ciple of liability for fault and for fault only, as the French sought to do and as we later
sought to do largely under their influence, or on the other hand, are to admit another
source of delictual liability alongside of fault, as the French law does in fact and is
coming to do in theory, and as our law has always done in fact. For in our law as it
stands one may perceive readily three types of delictual liability: (I) Liability for in-
tentional harm, (2) liability for unintentional culpable harm, (3) liability in certain
cases for unintended nonculpable harm. The first comport with the doctrine of no lia-
bility without fault. The third cannot be fitted thereto . . . We are not questioning
a long-established dogma in Anglo-American administration of justice, therefore, when
we ask whether the orthodox theory of the last generation is adequate as an analytical
statement of the law that is, or as a philosophical theory of the law that ought to be.
My own belief is that it is neither." PouND, IxRODUCTIoN TO THE PHM.osoPny OF
LAw (1922) 167.
For more elaborate discussion and citation of authorities on the phenomena of ab-
solute liability see, Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Cer-
tain Types of Tort Cases (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 8o5; Harris, Liability Without
Fault (1932) -6 TUIAxa L. REV. 337; Isaacs, Fault and Liability (1918) 31 HARV. L.
REV. 954; Seavey, Some Speculation as to Respondeat Superior, in HAxv An LEGAL
EssAYs (34) 433, 44; Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability---Suggested Changes in
Classification(1917) 30 HAiy. L. REV. 241, 319, 409; Takcayanagi, Liability Without
Fault in the Modernz Csvil and Common Law (1921) 16 IiiL. L. REV. 163, 268, (192a2)
17 ILL L. REV. 187, 416; Vold, The Functonal Perspective for the Law of Torts (1936)14 NEB. L. BULL. 217, 228-241.
It may be added for good measure that the American Law Institute formulates its
general statement of the recognized principle of absolute liability as follows in REsTATE-
MENT, ToRTs (1938) §§ 519, 520:
§ 9rg. "Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activ-
ity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as
likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting
thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is
exercised to prevent the harm."
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process. 1 The two cases differ sharply in their views of the seriousness
of the harm involved in defamation by radio, the one regarding it as
comparable in this respect to that of defamation by newspaper, 12 the
other asserting that newspaper defamations possess possibilities for
harm far greater than defamations by radio.'3 The two cases differ
sharply even as to their grasp of what are the actual physical facts of
radio broadcasting. The Nebraska case recognizes that the speaker
and radio station operator participate in the process of broadcasting,
that they cooperate to effect the publication.' 4 The Pennsylvania case,
on the other hand, asserts that the radio station has leased its facilities
§ 52o. "An activity is ultrahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious
harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exer-
cise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage."
See also, comments a-h to § 52o.
ii. The court lifts the following from its earlier opinion in Rich Hill Coal Co. v.
Bashore, 334 Pa. 449, 489, 7 A. (2d) 302, 321 (1939) : "But in common law actions of
tort it is the 'law of the land' that liability cannot be imposed upon one who is without
fault. To legislate a person presumptively guilty of either a crime or a tort is an at-
tempted erosion of 'the substance of original justice'." Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 306 (Pa. 1939). That legislation may constitutionally
base liability upon the doing of damage rather than upon the presence of fault is abun-
dantly clear, however, at the present time. See, for instance, the following: "Much
emphasis is laid upon the criticism that the act creates liability Without fault. This is
sufficiently answered by what has been said, but we may add that liability without fault
is not a novelty in the law. The common law liability of the carrier, of the innkeeper,
of him who employed fire or other dangerous agency or harbored a mischievous ani-
mal, was not dependent altogether upon questions of fault or negligence. Statutes im-
posing liability without fault have been sustained. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Mathews, i65 U. S. 1, 22 (1896) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Zernecke, 183 U. S.
582, 586 (igoi)." Pitney, J., in New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. i88, 204
(i9i6).
12. "The defendant company, like most radio broadcasters, is to a large extent
engaged in the business of commercial advertising for pay . . . Such commercial
advertising is strongly competitive with newspaper advertising because it performs
a similar office between those having wares to advertise and those who are potential
users of those wares. Radio advertising . . . competes with newspapers, magazines,
and publications of every nature. The fundamental principles of law involved in pub-
lication by a newspaper and by a radio station seem to be alike. There is no legal rea-
son why one should be favored over another, nor why a broadcasting station should be
granted special favors as against one who may be the victim of a libelous publication."
Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 357, 243 N. W. 82, 86 (1932).
13. "Newspaper defamations possess possibilities for real harm far greater than
defamations by radio, as they constitute permanent, continuing records, which, through
circulation, are constantly republished. The radio word is quickly spoken and, gen-
erally, as quickly forgotten." Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A.
(2d) 302, 310 (Pa. 1939).
In making this offhand generalization on the question of fact Chief Justice Kephart
apparently entirely overlooked the circumstance that what appears in newspapers fre-
quently gets equally perfunctory attention from readers and may often not be noticed
at all, many readers skimming through headlines, etc., and reading only such portions
as happen to appeal to them. The learned judge apparently overlooked also the im-
measurably wider diffusion attained by radio transmission than by newspaper, as well
as the far greater power of the human voice to stir the interest and emotions of listen-
ers. Who can doubt, for instance, in the light of his own personal knowledge of the
phenomenon, that the radio addresses of President Franklin D. Roosevelt are far more
impressive to listeners at receiving sets than they are to readers who merely see them
in print. See DAvis, RADio LAW (2d ed. i93o) 1o2: "One can inflame people with the
spoken word in a way in which it cannot be done by the printed word."
14. See note 6 supra.
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to the advertiser for the time being,15 and treats the question as one of
the answerability of the lessor for the misconduct of his lessee.
If it be conceded that Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting
Co. correctly states that the local Pennsylvania law of defamation does
not involve absolute liability but merely a high standard of care,1 6 the
conclusion announced by the court that a non-negligent radio station
cannot be held liable for an impromptu defamatory interpolation fol-
lows readily. In most jurisdictions, however, the broader view of the
law of defamation that the publisher of unprivileged defamatory utter-
ances publishes at his peril prevails.' 7 In such jurisdictions, then, how is
liability for defamatory interpolation to be dealt with? On that ques-
tion, manifestly, the Pennsylvania pronouncement is not in point, rest-
ing as it does upon a fundamentally different underlying basis for
liability.
II. PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE
The purpose of this article is to support the view that radio stations
under the common law of defamation should properly be held to the
same liability for defamatory interpolations as they are for defamatory
utterances contained in written or printed manuscripts transmitted to
radio listeners by their broadcasting operations.
The arguments on behalf of radio stations encountered in this
connection are essentially the same old arguments, slightly adapted as
to phraseology, which have previously but unsuccessfully been urged
i5. This deceptive expression is used to describe the facts, both at the beginning
and toward the close of Chief Justice Kephart's opinion, as well as in his attempt to
define the issue in the third paragraph of the opinion. By adopting that deceptive ex-
pression Chief Justice Kephart greatly obscured the realities presented to the court for
analysis in reaching its decision.
The briefs submitted to the Pennsylvania Court in the Summit case used more
candid language: "It operated the apparatus which was the means by which Jolson's
alleged defamatory utterance reached the public generally." Brief for Appellant, p. 45.
Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302 (Pa. 1939). "A broad-
casting station operates facilities for disseminating speech." Brief for Intervening Ap-
pellant, p. 3. In this brief, however, appears the statement that the station's facilities
had been temporarily leased to an advertiser. Id. at 23.
The deceptive expression that the broadcaster rented its facilities to the speaker at
the microphone was urged upon the Nebraska Court without success in Sorensen v.
Wood. See Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio (1935) I9 MINN.
L. R v. 61I, 6x5. See infra p. 292.
16. See note 2 supra.
17. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185 (1909) ; Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner,
250 U. S. 29o (igi) ; Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F. (2d) 207 (App. D. C.
1925), 4i A. L. R. 483; Taylor v. Hearst, 1o7 Cal. 262, 4o Pac. 392 (i895); Barr v.
Birkner, 44 Neb. 197, 62 N. W. 494 (1895) ; Walker v. Bee-News Publishing Co., 122
Neb. 5H1, 24o N. W. 579 (1932); Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82
(1932), 82 A. L. R. io98 (933) ; Hankinson v. Bilby, 2 Car. & K. 44o, 175 Eng. Rep.
R. 182 (Ex. 1847), same case, 16 M. & W. 442, 153 Eng. Rep. R. 1262 (Ex. 1847);
E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [igio] A. C. 20; Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers,
[19291 2 K. B. 331 (C. A.) ; Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 4 Sess. Cas. 645 (1902).
The problem on the merits is carefully analyzed with a mass of supporting author-
ity in Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three Conflicting Judicial Views as to a Question of
Defamation (1912) 60 U. OF PA. L. REv. 365. In addition, see HARPER, TORTS (1935)
§ 237; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §§ 563, 564, 579, 58o and comments thereto.
254 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
upon the courts in the effort to relieve radio stations from liability
where defamatory manuscripts have been broadcast. Accordingly, a
comprehensive discussion of the basis of liability for defamatory inter-
polations must review to a very considerable extent the general field.
One way of putting the matter is to ask whether the arguments which
up to now have been held by most of the courts to be unsound as applied
to broadcasting of defamatory manuscrpits can be recognized as sound
as applied to defamatory interpolations.
III. THE TYPEs OF CASES INVOLVED IN DEFAMATION BY RADIO
Four types of circumstances under which the question of the radio
station's liability for defamatory broadcasts may arise may for con-
venience's sake be distinguished.
I. Where Radio Station's Own Announcer Speaks Into the
Microphone
In the first type of case the speaker at the microphone is employed
by the radio station for that purpose. In such a case the radio
station by its own agents not only operates its broadcasting apparatus
but also utters into the microphone the speech which is broadcast to
the listening public. No one seems to question that where this combina-
tion of facts occurs the ordinary law of defamation is applicable if the
the utterances broadcast are defamatory.18 In this type of broadcast,
accordingly, the radio station is as accountable for a defamatory inter-
polation as it is for any other part of the broadcast. In such a case
the secondary question as to whether a defamatory interpolation not
contained in the submitted manuscript is to be dealt with as libel or as
slander may require some attention,"9 but in any event the radio station
is here subject to liability on the same basis as are other publishers of
defamatory utterances.
2. Where an Outside Speaker Utters Defamatory Statements
Contained in a Previously Submitted Manuscript
In the second type of case the speaker given access to the micro-
phone is an outside speaker, as, for instance, the representative of
18. See Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 312 (Pa.
1939).
That on such facts liability would follow in the absence of an applicable privilege
was conceded by the attorneys for the radio broadcasters in the briefs submitted in the
Summit case. In the Brief for Appellant, p. 44, it was conceded that the newspaper
analogy was close even in cases where a defamatory manuscript is read into the micro-
phone by an outside speaker. In the Brief for Intervening Appellant, p. 22, it is con-
ceded that the broadcasting station should be liable for defamatory words spoken over
its facilities by its own agents or employees who have been authorized to speak.
19. Vold, supra note 15, at 639; Haley, The Law on Radio Programs (1937) 5
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 157, 182; cf. Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N. Y. Supp.
188 (Sup. Ct 1937) ; Irwin v. Ashhurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. (2d) 1127 (1938). In addi-
tion, see RESTATmENT, ToRTs (1938) § 568, comment f; Graharp, Defaination and Radio
(1937) 12 WASH. L. REy. 282, 288.
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a commercial advertiser, or a political speaker, who reads from a manu-
script the defamatory utterances which are then transmitted to the
public by the radio station's operation of the broadcasting apparatus.
The available cases to date have held that on such facts the station's
participation in the transmission of defamatory utterances subjects it
to liability as publisher.
20
So far as these cases have expressed the legal basis for this con-
clusion they have invoked the analogy of the newspaper's liability under
the law of defamation. As reasons for invoking the newspaper analogy
these cases have pointed out that the facts regarding publication, as
between newspaper and radio, are here closely analogous, not only with
regard to the mechanical details affecting practicable control over the
contents to be published 21 but also, and especially, with regard to the
parallel and competing economic services rendered by the newspaper
and the radio in the field of advertising and publicity from which both
derive their financial support. 22  These cases have also pointed out that
in defamation by radio the more general considerations supporting the
application of strict liability for defamatory utterances come into play
rather than the considerations supporting the application of the less
exacting rules of negligence law.23 On the other hand, skeptical critics
20. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934) ; Soren-
sen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932), 82 A. L. R. io98 (1933) ; Miles v.
Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 2o P. (2d) 847 (1933). This position is also taken for
granted in Irwin v. Ashhurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. (2d) 1127 (1938) wherein, however,
the privilege available to the speaker was held also applicable to the radio station in
the broadcasting of courtroom proceedings.
21. This matter was thoroughly examined in the arguments that were urged upon
the Nebraska Court in Sorewen v. Wood. In the radio station's brief on the first ap-
peal the argument was phrased as follows (p. 21) : "A newspaper is printed, and either
the proprietor or his agents must necessarily read the matter inserted in the paper be-
fore it can be put into type and published. The cases hold that a newspaper owner
cannot say that he did not know when it was impossible to print it without knowing.
The situation here is entirely different. Granting that this publication was libel, al-
though there is a very grave question as to whether it was libel or slander, it was done
in such a manner, that is, by speaking, that it was under the circumstances impossible
for the broadcasting station to know in advance what Wood intended to say. The situ-
ation is nothing like that of a newspaper proprietor whose publication is by words he
or his agents set into type and print." This argument was in that case answered in
great detail in briefs submitted on behalf of the plaintiff. Vold, supra note i5, at 631.
After this presentation in the briefs, and reference thereto in the oral arguments to
the court the Supreme Court of Nebraska spoke as follows: ". . . newspaper publi-
cation . . . is closely analogous to publication by radio." Sorensen v. Wood, 123
Neb. 348, 356, 243 N. W. 82, 86 (r932).
22. "The defendant company, like most radio broadcasters, is to a large extent en-
gaged in the business of commercial advertising for pay . . . Such commercial ad-
vertising is strongly competitive with newspaper advertising because it performs a sim-
ilar office between those having wares to advertise and those who are potential users of
those wares. Radio advertising is one of the most powerful agencies in promoting the
principles of religion and politics. It competes with newspapers, magazines, and publi-
cations of every nature." Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 357, 43 N. W. 82, 86 (1932).
23. . .. they [the jury] were told in effect that, if the station owner honestly
and in good faith exercised due care, he is absolved from liability for ti-ansmitting un-
privileged defamatory words uttered by a speaker. It has often been held in newspaper
publication, which is closely analogous to publication by radio, that due care and honest
mistake do not relieve a publisher from liability for libel. In Peck v. Tribune Co., 214
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of these decisions, attorneys for, or sympathizers with radio stations
in this matter,24 have in their arguments persistently ignored not only
the commercial and economic aspects of the question but also the more
general considerations supporting the application of strict liability.
Instead, they have reasoned from the assumption that fault was the
proper criterion for liability and have sought to magnify the differences
in mechanical detail involved.
2 5
U. S. 185 (igog), Mr. Justice Holmes said: 'If the publication was libelous, the de-
fendant took the risk. As was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, "Whenever a
man publishes, he publishes at his peril".' . . . The fundamental principles of the
law involved in publication by a newspaper and by a radio station seem to be alike.
There is no legal reason why one should be favored over another nor why a broadcast-
ing station should be granted special favors as against one who may be a victim of a
libelous publication." Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 356, 357, 243 N. W. 82, 86
(1932). Most of this language is quoted With approval in Miles v. Wasmer, Inc., 172
Wash. 466, 472, 20 P. (2d) 847, 848 (1933).
"In the case of a newspaper publisher absence of negligence is no defense . ..
Yet he is not helpless. He knows that without any fault of him or any of his employees
some one sometime surreptitiously may insert in his paper some line of libel. He takes
that risk. He can insure himself against resulting loss through the subscription and
advertising rates he charges or otherwise. The owner of a broadcasting station knows
that some time some one may misuse his station to libel another. He takes that risk.
He too can insure himself against resulting loss." Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co.,
8 F. Supp. 889, 89o (W. D. Mo. 1934).
24. See Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 308, n. i4,
for a purported list of such critical comments. Without lingering over the apparent
lack of adequate discrimination in the compilation of that list, it may be pointed out
that most of the inspiration for such critical comment in the now available legal litera-
ture is traceable to the efforts of attorneys directly in the service of radio broadcasting
companies, but whose role as special pleaders has not been directly revealed in the con-
tributions in question. The earliest of these critical comments appeared shortly after
the case of Sorensen v. Wood was decided, and has been frequently cited by student
note writers in law reviews, some of which help to swell the array set out in the above-
mentioned footnote. Sorensen v. Wood was decided on June 1O, 1932. The decision
was vigorously assailed in that year's Report of the Standing Committee on Communi-
cations of the American Bar Association (1932) 57 A. B. A. REP. 423, 445. That year
the chairman of that committee was Mr. Louis G. Caldwell, and for a time his suc-
cessor in that position, Mr. John W. Guider, served as acting chairman. That both
these eminent gentlemen were about that time actively engaged as counsel for broad-
casting stations is apparent from numerous reported cases. About the same time ap-
peared Mr. Guider's magazine article, Liability for Defamation in Pohtical Broadcasts
(1932) 2 J. RADIO L. 708, which criticizes Sorensen v. Wood with even greater elabora-
tion. This is the article cited by the Pennsylvania Court in the Summit case, 8 A. (2d)
302, 311, n. 26 (Pa. 1939) for the proposition that the public interest will be best served
by a rule which will release a broadcasting station from liability for remarks made by
others where the station has exercised due care. When the matter was first considered
before the American Law Institute most of the discussion that took place came from Mr.
J. C. Hardgrove, another attorney for a broadcasting station, who in two lengthy talks
set forth the radio station's side of the question, 12 PRoc. A. L. I. 357-359, 361 (I935),
while no one spoke for the other side (see remark by Judge Tuttle, "We are hearing
only one side of this thing". Id. at 362). To these three "sources", may be added the
early speculations in DAVIS, THE LAW OF RADIO COMMUNICATION (1927) c. io, espe-
cially pp. 164, 168-170, before any courts had passed on the question, which were based
throughout on the palpably erroneous assumption thit tort liability must be based on
wrongdoing or negligence. This work even rationalizes the absolute liability of the law
of defamation in newspaper cases as in reality an application of the law of negligence.
These four early "sources" are found to set forth practically every idea that has since
been echoed in criticism of the stricter rules of liability applied by the courts to radio
stations as to other publishers.
25. See works criticised in note 24 supra. Professor Bohlen's remarks as reported
in the proceedings of the American Law Institute are of essentially the same character.
12 PRoc. A. L. I. 356 (935); 14 id. at 85-86 (1937).
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Even severe critics now admit, however, that where an outside
speaker given access to the broadcasting apparatus reads into the micro-
phone a defamatory statement contained in the manuscript used for
the purpose, the newspaper analogy in defamation is properly applied as
the basis for the radio station's liability.26 On such facts it is too clear
for argument that the radio station by its emloyees intended to partici-
pate in the transmission of the words found in that manuscript, whether
or not anyone connected with the station became personally aware of
the exact words. It is equally clear in such cases that the radio station
has the same opportunity to guard against defamatory utterances by
scrutiny of the manuscript as is available to newspapers by scrutiny of
copy submitted for publication. Under these facts, dearly enough, news-
paper and radio as publishers of the utterances in question are closely
analogous, even without our taking into account the commercial and
economic parallel between the two enterprises which compete in the
field of advertising and publicity, and without our considering the
broad underlying considerations supporting the application of strict lia-
bility in the field of defamation.
3. Where Radio Station Dispenses With Previous Submission of
Manuscript
In the third type of case an outside speaker, is given access to the
radio station's microphone but the previous submission of a manu-
script is not required by the radio station or a manuscript is not used at
all. Examples are the practice of interviewing casual strangers selected
from the crowd to answer questions on various topics before a micro-
phone brought out to the sidewalk at a busy street intersection and the
broadcast of details of athletic events by an observer speaking from the
athletic field or stadium as the events are in progress. Somewhat similar
aspects are presented in broadcasts of utterances made before micro-
phones placed in pulpits, court rooms, banquet halls and political con-
ventions. In current broadcasting practice the most conspicuous
instance of this type is probably found in the so-called relay broadcast-
ing that takes place in the use of chain programs. In such cases the
chain program usually originates at a central studio, as for instance in
New York. The content of the chain program, which can be supervised
there, is then carried over telephone wires to local broadcasting stations
:26. "As we have pointed out, however, in all these cases the defamatory statements
were contained in the manuscript of the program prepared beforehand and available to
the station, which may be presumed to have intended to broadcast whatever was in the
script, even if it did not take the care to go over it beforehand. The analogy to a news-
paper, which intends to publish whatever its employees set up in type and print in the
paper, is therefore close." Brief for Appellant, p. 44, Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302 (Pa. 1939). See also remarks of Professor Bohlen
in 14 PRoc. A. L. I. 86 (1937).
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in various parts of the country. Without any possibility of supervision
or control of the content at the local broadcasting stations these pro-
grams are transmitted over telephone wires directly from the originat-
ing studio to the apparatus of the local stations and transmitted to
radio listeners by the broadcasting operations of such local radio
stations.
In all cases of this third type it must be recognized that the radio
station in the nature of things intends by carrying out the process of
operating its broadcasting apparatus to transmit whatever the speaker
before the microphone may see fit to utter.2 On the score of intention,
therefore, no reason is apparent for distinguishing cases of this third
type from cases of the second type where the contents of a manuscript
are broadcast. So far as the basis for the radio station's liability for
defamation is concerned the policy considerations are also substantially
the same in both these types of cases. No duty is by law imposed upon
the radio station to make these broadcasts. In such cases the radio
station for its own convenience or profit sees fit to broadcast without
requiring the previous production of a manuscript or other direct con-
trol over the content to be transmitted. That mere circumstance would
seem to afford no reason for shifting the burden of defamatory publica-
tions from the active perpetrators to their passive innocent victims.
Moreover, in all such cases the radio station has the practical alternative
of requiring an adequate contract of indemnity from sponsors of such
programs as a condition to their being broadcast without the previous
scrutiny afforded by the submission of a manuscript. Unless additional
elements raising questions of privilege may happen on certain occasions
to be involved, therefore, it would seem that the mere circumstance that
the manuscript is dispensed with affords no basis for relieving the
radio station from the same strict liability for defamation that is appli-
cable when a manuscript is used. The scant judicial authority on this
point at present available supports this view. 28
27. "Those waves of air he changed into electrical impulses. Them he threw out
upon the ether knowing they would be caught up by thousands and changed again into
sound waves and into a human voice. He intended to do these things." Coffey v. Mid-
land Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 89o (W. D. Mo. 1934),
2S. "The mere matter of the distance of X from the broadcasting instrumentality
when he speaks into it certainly cannot affect the liability of the owner of the station.
Whether X's defamatory words reach the broadcasting instrumentality from afar by
electric impulses carried by wire or directly through air waves created by his voice cer-
tainly cannot affect the liability of the owner of the station. ...
"The conclusion seems inescapable that the owner of the station is liable. It is
he who broadcasted the defamation. He took the utterance of the speaker which came
to him in the form of pulsations in the air. Those waves of air he changed into elec-
trical impulses. Them he threw out upon the ether knowing they would be caught up by
thousands and changed again into sound waves and into a human voice. He intended
to do *these things. . .
The owner of a broadcasting station knows that sometime some one may
misuse his station to libel another. He takes that risk. . . .
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4. Oral Interpolations Without Warning in the Broadcast of
Manuscript Utterances
In the fourth type of case the speaker given access to the
microphone is an outside speaker, such as a commercial advertiser or
a political speaker, who interpolates without warning a defamatory
utterance which is not contained in the manuscript being broad-
casted. On these exact facts only one recently decided Pennsyl-
vania case is at present available. This case denied the radio station's
liability, taking the position that in Pennsylvania the law of defamation
rests on the basis of negligence,29 although dicta from the earlier cases
wherein the law of defamation was held to involve absolute liability
indicate that cases of this type afford no valid basis for distinction.8"
It is with reference to cases of this type that the most acute differ-
ences of opinion have arisen. Cases involving defamatory interpola-
tions in radio broadcasts thei'efore most urgently call for clear analysis
in the ascertainment of the weight to be given the conflicting considera-
tions involved in the determination of the basis for liability.
IV. THE UNDERLYING DIVERGENT ASSUMPTIONS FOUND IN AVAIL-
ABLE CURRENT DISCUSSION OF LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION
BY RADIO
Two fundamental differences in the underlying assumptions from
which the course of reasoning starts are sharply manifested in current
discussion with regard to the basis of liability properly applicable to the
facts of defamation by radio. The first fundamental difference in as-
sumptions is with regard to the physical facts of broadcasting. Does the
process of transmission involve the active participation of the operator
of the radio station with the speaker at the microphone? If so, the
facts readily support the conclusion that each participated in acts of
publication. Or, on the contrary, is transmission to radio listeners of
"The case here certainly is not like that in which one only provides another with
an instrumentality which that other, all unsuspected by him who furnished it, uses to
inflict injury. Here the instrumentality is operated by the owner for another who has
hired him to operate it." Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 89o (W.
D. Mo. 1934).
29. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 3o2 (Pa. 1939).
See supra p. 249.
3o. "In my thought, then, I put the primary offender in the local studio of KMBC
at Kansas City. I assume his good reputation; I assume that nothing in any former
performance by him should put the owner of the station on inquiry; I assume even that
he has submitted a manuscript and that nothing in it is questionable; I assume a sud-
den utterance by him of defamatory words not included in the manuscript, an utterance
so quickly made as to render impossible its prevention; I assume, in short, a complete
absence of the slightest negligence on the part of the owner of the station. With those
assumptions is the owner of KMBC liable to one of whom the primary offender has
falsely spoken as an ex-convict who has served time in a penitentiary?
"The conclusion seems inescapable that the owner of the station is liable." Coffey
v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 89o (W. D. Mo. 1934). See also excerpts
from Sorensen v. Wood, quoted in notes 21, 22, 23 supra.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the speaker's utterances into the microphone in substance automatic?
If so, it is not so clear how the radio station is technically a publisher.
The second fundamental difference in assumptions touches the basis
for liability. Is the basis for liability applicable to the radio station
under the facts of radio broadcasting to be found in strict liability such
as is imposed by the law of defamation? Or, should the basis for such
liability be found in the less exacting law of negligence?
These two fundamental differences in underlying assumptions
became sharply manifest in the first case of defamation by radio to
reach an appellate court, the leading case of Sorensen, v. Wood.3' The
Nebraska Court, in deciding this case, regarded the radio station as a
participator in the acts of transmission with the speaker at the micro-
phone.3 2  It thus dealt with the radio station as a publisher of the
messages broadcast. However, in giving its reasons for invoking the
newspaper analogy in the law of defamation as the basis for the radio
station's liability the court strongly emphasized the parallel position of
newspapers and radio stations as business competitors in the field of
advertising and publicity " and emphatically referred to the presence in
radio cases of the underlying considerations of policy which require the
application of strict liability in defamation cases.3 4  The Nebraska
Court thus incidentally recognized that the law of defamation is but
a branch of the wider field of absolute or strict liability, and that the
mere resort to novel but highly effective processes for achieving trans-
mission to the public affords no reason for relaxing for radio stations
the strict rule of liability applicable as a matter of course to the older
familiar methods of publication.35 Several other courts, relying largely
on Sorensen v. Wood, have adopted the same views.36 Recently, in a
taxation case, after careful review of the operative facts of broadcast-
ing, the Supreme Court of the United States pronounced that the broad-
casting station as distinct from its customer, the outside speaker at the
microphone, is engaged in the business of transmitting the speaker's
utterances across state lines to listeners in other states.37
31. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932), 82 A. L. R. iio6 (1933).
32. See note 6 supra.
33. See note 22 supra.
34. See note 23 supra.
35. See quotation from Justice Brandeis, note 1o5 infra.
36. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934); Miles
v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 (3933). In the first mentioned
case, Judge Otis takes careful account of the operative process of broadcasting. In
Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 6r, 74 P. (2d) 127 (938), the same position was recog-
nized, but the defendant broadcasting station was held not liable because of privilege.
37. Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650 (1936).
Even the operator of a receiving set is a publisher, who can be liable if unprivileged.
Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191 (193) (copyright). In the case of
a non-commercial operator of a receiving set, presumably a large range of privilege
would be available in the interest of leaving open this way to information, entertain-
ment, and cultural development.
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The same two fundamental differences in underlying assumptions
have insistently cropped out in most of the subsequent critical discus-
sion.38 Hardly an idea can be found in the discussion to date, whether
in the professional literature, before the American Law Institute, or
before other courts, which was not in some form included in the mate-
rial that was urged upon the Nebraska Court in Sorensen v. Wood.30
V. THE FACTS OF RADIo BROADCASTING ARE DEVELOPING TowARD
AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION
Doubtless one of the reasons for the persistence of such widely
divergent assumptions regarding the facts of radio broadcasting is that
the facts themselves have been rapidly changing. In active life nothing
stands still. When controversies arise in a course of an activity the
details of which are currently changing, the law is applied while the
changes are in progress.
The broadcast which was involved in the case of Sorensen v.
Wood took place in August,I93o. The record of testimony in that
case shows that during this broadcast the radio station's monitor
operator was in the control room at the studio and controlled the volume
of the broadcast as the speech proceeded. The facts within the range
of judicial notice, moreover, made it very clear that this volume control
was exercised through the process of readjustment of the modulation
of the sound wave from the microphone upon the carrier wave from
the transmitter with reference to the varying character of the speaker's
voice from moment to moment as the speech proceeded. This process
of modulation readjustment so modified the vocal sounds uttered into
the microphone that the resulting transmission could be picked up near
and far by receiving sets in the form of intelligible and continuously
audible speech. This process of modulation readjustment not only
increased the range of the broadcast but also avoided gaps in the effec-
tive transmission and distortions caused by false and blurring sounds
set up in the transmitting process. The substance of these facts of
active participation by the radio station in the acts of transmission to
the public during this broadcast was admitted by stipulation in the later
38. See notes 24 and 25 supra.
39. The substance of the arguments for the plaintiff that were submitted to the
court on the two appeals that were made in that case may be found in two law maga-
zine articles by the present writer. Vold, Defamation by Radio (1932) 2 J. RADIO L.
673; Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio (1935) 19 MINN. L RV.
61i.
The attorneys for the KFAB Broadcasting Co., the substantial defendants in Soren-
sen v. Wood, submitted elaborate briefs on both appeals in that case, but have not other-
wise given their views wider professional publicity. It is but due Eourtesy to them tc
state as a matter of personal knowledge in this connection that their briefs did contain
in some form the counterparts for practically everything that has since-appeared in the
legal literature in support of a milder rule of liability for radio stations. See also notes
68 and 7o infra.
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stages of the litigation in Sorensen v. Wood.40  Essentially the same
viewpoint toward the facts of radio transmission has since then been
elaborately set out by the Supreme Court of the United States in a
taxation case as sustaining the conclusion that the radio station was
actively participating in the process of transmitting the speaker's utter-
ances to listeners at receiving sets in other states. 41  It would seem,
therefore, that on the physical facts of broadcasting that took place the
Nebraska Court in Sorensen v. Wood was readily justified in conclud-
ing that the owner of the radio station, by its agents, was a participator
with the speaker in the publication of the defamatory utterance. While
this aspect of the case was treated rather briefly in the court's opinion,
Chief Justice Goss, the author of that opinion, later made a more ex-
tended statement in regard to the matter in his remarks before the
American Law Institute, where the position taken by the court had been
criticized by certain speakers. Chief Justice Goss in those remarks
asserted that transmission by radio was not a purely automatic process,
and vigorously emphasized that the station's liability was based upon
the law of defamation and not on the principles of negligence.
42
Since the time when the facts of Sorensen v. Wood took place, in
August, 1930, great improvements in broadcasting apparatus have been
made. Transmitters have been so constructed that they can carry a
wider range of voice variations than formerly without serious loss or
distortion. Within the last year or two, moreover, an instrument,
sometimes referred to as an automatic volume compressor, has also
made its appearance. 43 This instrument, without the aid of the station's
monitor operator, to some degree 44 automatically readjusts the modula-
tion in response to the varying character of the speaker's voice. More-
over, for certain limited types of broadcasting, such as police station
calls to its cruiser cars, manual readjustments of modulation during the
calls are at least at some stations and in most instances entirely dis-
4o. This stipulation is quoted at length in Void, sipra note I5, at 617, n. 17.
41. Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 65o (1936).
42. 14 PRoc. A. L. I. 81-82 (1937).
43. The difficulties involved in securing adequate and accurate modulation read-
justments through manual'readjustment of the controls from moment to moment by the
monitor operator are described in STERLING, THE RADIo MANUAL (3d ed. 1938) 438-
439, 466-468. This is followed by a description of the new instrument which is auto-
matically to perform many of the functions which the monitoring operator heretofore
has had to perform manually. Id. at 468-471.
44. "It provides not less than 3 db improvement in average signal level." Id. at
471. (It may be mentioned that db stands for decibel, a term used to designate the
amount of variation in sound required for such variation to be discernible by the human
ear.) However, the same author indicates that the natural volume in variation of
speech and music may be as high as 6o db which must be compressed through modula-
tion adjustment into a range of about 40 db so as to avoid distortion through overmodu-
lation on the one hand and to prevent the program level from going below the noise
level on the other. Id. at 438-439. Mere automatic readjustment to the extent of 3 db
under present conditions is far from adequate for ordinary entertainment and adver-
tising programs.
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pensed with, the automatic operation of the broadcasting apparatus
being found adequate for the relatively limited purpose at hand.45
Further mechanical improvements in broadcasting apparatus doubtless
are now in the making and can be expected to take their part in the
practical work of broadcasting in the relatively near future.
The physical developments in the technique and apparatus of
broadcasting are tending more and more to reduce the scope of the
station's detailed and active participation with the speaker in the im-
mediate acts of transmission. It is therefore probable that radio broad-
casting is on the way toward becoming to a considerable extent, if not
entirely, an automatic process once the machinery supplying the nec-
essary current for transmitter and microphone is set in motion and the
adjustments of the apparatus to the speaker's voice have been made at
the outset of his speech.
VI. How FAR, IF AT ALL, DOES SUCH CHANGE IN THE PHYSICAL
FACTS OF BROADCASTING REQUIRE MODIFICATION IN THE:
APPLICABLE LAW?
I. General Perspective: Does Such Development Reduce or Accentuate
the Need for Protection Against Injury to Reputation?
It is readily apparent that the above described changes in the facts
of broadcasting render the process of transmission increasingly effec-
tive. Thus, the danger to innocent victims is increased instead of
reduced with every advance in technique which reduces or eliminates
the range of effective scrutiny of the contents of broadcasts. Such
developments in the physical processes of broadcasting as render radio
transmission substantially automatic far from calling for change in the
applicable law from defamation to negligence, rather accentuate the
broader considerations of policy which in the interest of security of
personal reputation require the application to those who make defama-
tory broadcasts of the traditional strict liability of the law of defama-
tion. It is to be particularly noted, too, in this connection, that the law
of defamation is itself a portion of the much wider field of strict lia-
bility, which is applied to the facts of defamation in order the more
completely to provide practically effective security to the interest in per-
sonal reputation. 46  The security of personal reputation, it may be
45. CUNNINGHAM, THE RADIO PATROL SYSTEM OF THE CiTY OF NEW YORK (1933)
4. Officers in charge in the City of Lincoln, Nebraska, have stated in conversation that
the same is true of police station calls by radio to cruiser cars under the system there
in use.
46. "But while the judicial movement, in cases of physical damage, has been from
imposing absolute liability toward requiring culpability, the -movement as to defamation
has been the reverse. . .
"It seems clear that the reasons given for the milder rule in the case of highway
traffic or building operations do not apply to defamation. The utterance of charges
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added, has from time immemorial been recognized as an important item
in general security.
47
There is therefore no basis in policy for any gratuitous assumption
that any mere change in the physical processes of transmission requires
that the basis for the perpetrator's liability for defamatory utterances
be shifted from strict liability to negligence.
Put another way, the policy question of whether the strict
liability of the law of defamation or the less exacting rules of the law
of negligence will attain the greater measure of human welfare will
still remain, even though the radio broadcasting process should eventu-
ally become practically automatic. Prima facie, it is not apparent how
the social importance of the interest in personal reputation as a part of
the interest in general security is in anywise diminished through
improvements in the means of radio transmission which render attacks
upon personal reputation all the more effective and dangerous.
The bearing on policy, moreover, of the radio station's readily
available alternative of indemnity from the advertiser who supplies the
defamatory words broadcast should in this connection not be over-
looked.48  The rule of strict liability at this point in actual practice
results largely in radio stations' requiring indemnity from the adver-
tisers who supply the defamatory utterances transmitted by their broad-
casting operations. The final result when the radio station is held to
Which are not true in fact and are defamatory in their nature is not essential to the
progress of the community in comfort or civilization, nor does it generally tend to pro-
mote the public welfare. In some exceptional situations where it is for the general wel-
fare, or is reasonably requisite for the protection of private interests, that men should
feel free to make statements which are prima facie defamatory, the law affords protec-
tion, absolute or conditional. But outside of these exceptional classes I believe that
more harm than good would result from making proof of negligence a requisite to the
plaintiff's prima facie case, or from allowing to the defendant the defense of careful-
ness." Smith, stpra note 17, at 470-471. See HARPE, TORTS (1933) §§ 237, 244; notes
22 and 23 supra, with accompanying text; quotation from Justice Brandeis, note Io5
infra.
47. Reference may be made to Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of
the Law of Defaimation (1903) 3 COL. L. REy. 546; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) 536-538; 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW (3d ed. 1923) 382-383; 3 id. 410-411.
48. The following form of indemnity clause which was in use by the National
Broadcasting Co. in its contracts with its advertisers in 1935, appeared by exhibits
presented in the case of Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d)
302 (Pa. 1939)."Except as otherwise hereinafter expressly provided the Advertising Agency will
save the Company harmless against all liability for libel, slander, unfair competition,
infringement of trademarks, tradenames or program titles, violation of rights of pri-
vacy, and infringement of copyrights and proprietary rights and all other liability to
third parties resulting from the broadcasting of the programs herein provided for."
From Exhibit "D", Supplemental Record appended to Brief for Appellee, p. 6z.
Through the courtesy of counsel for one of the local broadcasting stations the pres-
ent writer was recently furnished a blank form of the contracts currently in use by the
Central States Broadcasting System. Among the conditions in that contract appears
the following clause: "The advertiser agrees to save the Station harmless against any
claim or liability for libel, slander, or misrepresentation of fact by reason of the adver-
tiser's program or announcement." In addition, see note lO4 infra.
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strict liability is to put the burden of such defamatory utterances on
those in whose service they are broadcast. As a matter of social policy
that result would seem to be eminently wholesome. 49
49. The view expressed in the text was referred to with approval by Judge Otis in
Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 890 (W. D. Mo. 1934), as fol-
lows: "The owner of a broadcasting station knows that some time some one may mis-
use his station to libel another. He takes that risk. He too can insure himself against
resulting loss . . . The case here certainly is not like that in which one only pro-
vides another with an instrumentality which that other, all unsuspected by him who
furnished it, uses to inflict injury. Here the instrumentality is operated by the owner
for another who has hired him to operate it."
The same view was also referred to with approval by the trial judge in his memo-
randum opinion denying a motion for a new trial in the Summit case, as follows: "The
average newspaper publisher insures against resulting loss; there appears to be no legal
reason why a broadcasting company cannot do the same. Whether they purchase in-
surance or carry their own is immaterial. Nor are we impressed by the argument that
the cost to a broadcasting company would be prohibitive; no governmental agency regu-
lates the rate it may charge for its services." 87 PiTrsBuRGH LEa. J. 49, 5I (1939).
"Indemnifying agreements are sometimes taken with respect to particular broad-
casts, but the policy of some companies has been not to require such agreements gen-
erally except for political programs. These agreements are taken to safeguard the
broadcaster's interests and not to license the speaker to defame others. Under such
agreements the broadcaster's right is to recoup damages.
"An indemnity agreement may, of course, be required from all speakers or their
principals. The value of such agreements is subject to certain limitations depending
upon the responsibility of those executing them, but as a restraining and sobering in-
fluence they are worth while. They tend to bring home to the speaker the seriousness
of any indulgence in defamation and it would seem advisable to require all users of
radio facilities to give an indemnity agreement as a matter of course." McDonald and
Grimshaw, Radio Defamation (938) 9 Am L. REV. 328, 350-35I. (An appended foot-
note at p. 328, states that this contribution was written in June, 1937, by two attorneys
for the National Broadcasting Co.)
"Under the Sorensen v. Wood decision apparently the broadcaster can only pro-
tect himself by requiring indemnity from the speaker. The broadcaster can require such
a bond from one candidate, provided it requires such a bond from every other candidate
who speaks over its station. In other words, the broadcaster must not discriminate
between candidates. I have upon occasion advised clients to require indemnifying bonds
in bitterly contested campaigns." McMasters, Radio Law (1938) 4 JOHN MARSHALL
L. Q. 155, 157. See note 115 infra.
Against these views the brief for the broadcasting station on the appeal in the
Summit case submitted two objections. The first objection was phrased as follows:
"It is submitted that this argument begs the question of the policy of holding stations
liable for utterances they cannot prevent. The question is not whether a person de-
famed should have a right to recover from some one; it is rather whether an innocent
party who could not prevent the defamation should be answerable in damages there-
for." Brief for Appellant, p. 49.
This manner of describing the issue, however, itself begs the question, in that it in-
volves either one or both of two ordinarily untenable assumptions, namely, that the sta-
tion has not itself acted but is being held liable for the act of another, or that the basis
for its liability in any event must be negligence rather than the strict liability of the
law of defamation. Where it is manifest that the station actively participates in the
process of broadcasting, a fact emphasized both in Sorensen v. Wood and in Coffey v.
Midland Broadcasting Co., it is very clear that when liability is imposed it is for the
station's own act, not for the act of another. That the station as a matter of fact does
participate was actually admitted, even in the briefs submitted for the broadcasters, in
the Summit case. ". . . it operated the apparatus which was the means by which Jol-
son's alleged defamatory utterances reached the public generally." Brief for Appellant,
.45. "A broadcasting station operates facilities for dissemination of speech." Brief
for Intervening Appellant, p. 3. Accordingly, this first objection as phrased in the radio
station's brief must depend for its soundness on the position that negligence is the basis
for the liability to be imposed. Having already announced that view, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in its opinion naturally enough repeated this objection, para-
phrasing the language of defendant station's brief. Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 312 (Pa. 1939).
Where the view prevails, however, as it does in most jurisdictions, that the law of
defamation involves strict liability and does not rest on negligence, the materiality of
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It is not true at the present time that broadcasting of commercial
and political publicity has become entirely automatic. Let it be assumed
for the purposes of the present discussion, however, that the progress
of invention is tending so strongly in that direction that considerable
portions of many broadcasts can now be carried out automatically with-
out manual readjustment of modulation once the broadcasting apparatus
has been set in motion and preliminarily adjusted to the speaker's
voice. On such external facts in the physical process of broadcasting
the particular words of which complaint is made may well have been
transmitted automatically. The same may be true, of course, of defam-
atory interpolations orally interjected without warning during the
broadcast of a speech which as previously submitted in manuscript form
was entirely free from objection.
2. Where the Broadcasting Station's Own Announcer Utters the
Defamatory Words Into the Microphone
Recalling the several differing types of circumstances under which
broadcasting may take place, as classified at the beginning of this
paper,50 the first step in rationalization is to note that no matter how
automatic the immediate process of transmission may become, the
newspaper analogy will continue to be applicable to some types of broad-
casting. So long as the radio station's own agents supply the speech
the indemnity aspect of the matter is readily apparent. In that situation the availability
of indemnity provisions to radio stations demonstrates at once the complete and pal-
pable unreality of the asserted hardship on the radio station which is urged as the rea-
son for relieving the radio station from the same strict liability for its acts of publica-
tion which is applicable as a matter of course to its competing publishers.
The second objection to the view of the indemnity contract taken in the text above,
was phrased as follows in the radio station's brief in the Summit case: "Who would
insure against the utterance of defamation except at a great price, which certainly in
many cases would be economically prohibitive?" Brief for Appellant, pp. 49, 5o. This
objection, too, is paraphrased by the Pennsylvania Court. Summit Hotel Co. v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 312 (Pa. 1939). To this objection, however,
the exhibits in that case furnished a very convincing answer, in that the advertiser
himself furnishes the required indemnity as a condition to obtaining broadcasting serv-
ice. In this respect the practice of requiring indemnity contracts from radio advertisers
for whom the broadcasting is done is comparable to the familiar practice of requiring
indemnity bonds from execution plaintiffs to save the sheriff or other public officer
harmless from liability resulting in the event that the execution levied by the officer
turns out to be unprivileged. Current practice in radio broadcasting, as indicated in
note 48 supra, demonstrates that radio stations have it in their own power to require
such indemnity, a power they can exercise whenever they see fit to do so. In the same
connection it has been suggested by Mr. Donald G. Graham, who was attorney for the
broadcasting station in the case of Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 297 U. S. 65o (1936), that the indemnity bond from speakers furnishes little pro-
tection to the broadcaster since speakers ordinarily are financially irresponsible. See
Graham, Defamation and Radio (1937) 12 WASH. L. REV. 282, 291. To this way of
phrasing the objection there are two obvious answers: first, that many commercial ad-
vertisers utilizing chain broadcasts, etc., are not in fact as financially irresponsible as is
here suggested; second, if the speaker is actually thus irresponsible, the station ought
not by its activity to join with him in transmitting utterances which are defamatory of
innocent parties without being answerable to such innocent victims who otherwise will
be without redress.
50. See snepra p. 254.
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delivered into the microphone as well as operate the broadcasting
machinery there can be no question but that the radio station is a pub-
lisher of the utterances transmitted. 51 Such broadcasting constitutes a
large portion of the current radio advertising. Advertisers submit
their copy, to be put on the air through use of the radio station's own
announcer, much in the same manner as advertisers submit their copy
for publication in newspapers. Even the attorneys for the National
Association of Broadcasters admit that under such circumstances the
newspaper analogy is properly applicable to radio stations.52 Barring
changes through legislative enactment, such liability is unaffected by
the current scientific and engineering developments toward automatic
transmission. Neither in the physical facts involved nor in the policy
considerations applicable is there in such cases any significant reason
for differentiating the basis for liability applicable to newspaper and to
radio publication, the two leading types of commercial advertising.
Equally, there is no reason for granting special favors to broadcasting
stations as against the victims of their defamatory publications.
3. Where the Defamatory Words Are Contained in the Manuscript
Which Is Broadcast
a. Policy considerations remain unzffected
The second step in the unfolding of the applicable law though
radio transmission has tended to become automatic is an equally easy
one. The matter which is broadcast may be uttered into the microphone
by an outside speaker who reads it from a written or printed manuscript
which is made available for the radio station's previous scrutiny. In
such cases, irrespective of how automatic the immediate process of
transmission may become, the radio station faces merely the same type
of mechanical problem as does the newspaper with regard to the detec-
tion and elimination of defamatory content in the copy submitted for
publication. Moreover, the fact of direct business competition between
newspaper and radio in the field of advertising and publicity is not in
the least affected by these mechanical distinctions in the methods of
operation. The general policy considerations in favor of the security
of personal reputation from unprivileged defamation remain in full
force.
To be sure, copy readers in such cases cannot in the ordinary
course be experts on the law of defamation, whether employed in news-
paper plants or in radio stations. In both cases their employer runs
51. See note 18 supra.
52. "Manifestly a broadcasting station should be liable for defamatory words
spoken over its facilities by its own agents or employees who have been authorized to
speak." Brief for Intervening Appellant, p. 22, Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broad-
casting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302 (Pa. 1939).
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chances that some defamatory item may slip by the readers. In both
cases, too, language which to the copy reader may appear innocent may
to readers or hearers appear to be defamatory because of their knowl-
edge of facts unknown to the copy reader. 53 No reason is apparent on
this score why radio stations should enjoy greater consideration than
newspapers, nor is any reason apparent why either the newspaper or the
radio station should be favored at the expense of the victims of defama-
tory utterances which they have transmitted for their own profit.
The hardship on the radio stations in these defamatory manu-
script cases is in this regard no different and no greater than the cor-
responding hardship upon their competitors, the newspapers. More-
over, it is already a familiar practice with radio stations to require
indemnity from their advertisers. At the same time, the underlying
considerations of policy which, in the interest of the security of reputa-
tion require the application of the strict liability of the law of defama-
tion in the case of newspapers, are at least as urgently applicable to the
even more effective and more dangerous transmission of defamatory
utterances by radio.
5 4
b. Technical requisites for intentional publication are still fulfilled
The more meticulous analysis of the technical elements involved
in publication by radio transmission does not support any relaxation in
the strict liability to which the radio station is held in these cases. It
continues to be true that the broadcasting apparatus is maintained and
its operation carried on by the radio station. It continues to be true,
therefore, that by its maintenance and operation of the broadcasting
apparatus the rado station actively and intentionally assists the speaker
at the microphone in achieving the radio transmission that results.
Where the words uttered into the microphone are contained in the manu-
script submitted and available for scrutiny, moreover, there can be no
question that those are the very words which the radio station by its
operations intends to transmit. Whether or not the operators of the
transmission apparatus became conscious of the individual words read
by the speaker into the microphone is in that event immaterial.55 Thus,
even though manual modulation readjustment as the speech proceeded
53. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185 (igog) ; E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [19g1]
A. C. 2o. The matter is examined at greater length, with citation of authorities, in
HARPER, TORTS (1933) §§237, 244; Smith, supra note 17, at 461; Vold, supra note I5,
at 623-624. See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §§ 563, 564, 579, 580.
54. In Guider, supra note 24, at 708-713, the author, an attorney for radio broad-
casting companies, makes an impressive showing of the dangers to radio stations if the
strict liability of defamation is applied. Since that danger is merely the danger of hav-
ing to compensate injured innocent plaintiffs, it is obvious that such plaintiffs are to
the same extent exposed to danger by the radio station's broadcasting operations. See
also Vold, mpra note 15, at 633; note OO infra; note 13 supra.
55. See authorities cited in note 53 supra.
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should be entirely dispensed with, the transmission being then purely
automatic, the radio station's participation in the broadcast by operat-
ing the transmission apparatus " would still constitute an intentional
participation in the communication to others of the contents of the
manuscript. Such facts satisfy every technical element of publication.57
4. Where the Radio Station Does Not Require the Submission of a
Manuscript by the Advertiser
a. Both intentional publication and policy considerations still
remain unaffected
The third step in the unfolding of the applicable law though radio
transmission has tended to become automatic is again easily taken. If
the radio station does not require the submission of a manuscript by the
outside advertiser given access to its microphone, its general intention
to participate in the transmission of whatever words such advertiser
may see fit to utter into the microphone is still clear. Its physical
operations in the process of transmission are here the same as in the
case where written manuscripts are used. As in the case of the defama-
tory manuscript, therefore, there is in this case intentional participation
by the radio station's operator in the transmission of the outside adver-
tiser's utterances, whatever the particular words may be. Since sub-
mission of a manuscript could have been required but was omitted for
the radio station's own convenience or profit, this case from the stand-
point of policy is not appreciably different from a case that might be
supposed where the manuscript containing defamatory matter was sub-
mitted but scrutiny thereof was, for the station's own convenience or
profit, omittedY8  Moreover, no duty rests upon radio stations to make
56. ". . . the broadcasting of radio emanations, as distinguished from the produc-
tion of the sounds broadcasted, is effected by appellant and not by its customers . * '
They [the sounds] serve only to enable the broadcaster, by the use of appropriate ap-
paratus, to modulate the radio emanations which he generates. These emanations as
modulated, are projected through space to the receiving sets . . . On the argument
it was conceded that, in broadcasting for its customers, appellant, by generating the
necessary electric power and controlling the transmitter, produces the radio emanations
which actuate the receiving mechanisms located in other states." Stone, J., in Fisher's
Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 65o, 653-654 (1936). See also
notes 27 and 28 supra. For a recent detailed accounf of the scientific and mechanical
factors involved in current operation of broadcasting apparatus, see STEALING, THE
RADIo MANUAL (3d ed. 1938). See also note 37 supra.
57. This view of the facts, it may be noticed, readily brings operations of the radiostation in carrying out the process of broadcasting in these defamatory manuscript cases
within the definition of publication, as set forth by the American Law Institute: "Pub-
lication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act
to one other than the person defamed." RESTATEMIENT, ToaTS (1938) § 577. See id.,
§ 577, comment k.
As appears from the reports of the discussions before the Annual Meeting of the
Institute, the caveat to § 577 was inserted to avoid committing the Institute to any posi-
tion concerning the liability of radio stations in the case of defamatory interpolations
made without warning. See 12 PRoC. A. L. I. 355-363 (935) ; 14 id. at 73 (1937).
s8. Such in substance were the circumstances in this respect in Sorensen v. Wood,
for details of which see note 5 supra. As to the problem of privilege for political broad-
casts, see infra pp. 289-292.
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such broadcasts, and indemnity contracts from the advertisers of
unscrutinized programs can be insisted upon as a condition to such
broadcasting service.
It seems unnecessary to elaborate further on this point. The news-
paper analogy is found properly applicable to the radio station in the case
of broadcasting of defamatory utterances found in manuscripts sub-
mitted for scrutiny, whether or not the radio station's own announcer
utters them into the microphone. No reason is apparent why the burden
of such defamation should be shifted to the innocent victim of such
defamatory utterances merely because the radio station for its own
convenience or profit has seen fit to dispense with the use of manu-
scripts. Of course, if certain of such broadcasts involve occasions
which on independent grounds are to be regarded as privileged, the
question of the application of such privilege on the particular occasion
would also require attention.59
b. Application to chain programs and broadcasts of current events
It would seem to follow, accordingly, that if in chain programs
the newspaper analogy is properly applicable to the utterance as pub-
lished at the originating station, there is no basis for any different or
milder basis of liability for the defamatory utterance on the part of the
participating local stations to which the program is relayed for broad-
casting. Such local stations see fit for their own convenience and
profit to participate in the broadcasting of relay programs, the contents
of which they well know they have no means to scrutinize or control.
Thus there seems to be no reason why the burden of such defamation
should be shifted to its victim merely on the score that the local radio
station dispenses with the use of manuscript. It may be added that
the originators of chain programs being parties of established financial
responsibility, local stations that join chains can in such cases readily
be afforded ample practical protection through indemnity contracts
which would place the ultimate responsibilty for defamation upon the
sponsors of such programs, the parties who furnish the defamatory
utterances for broadcast. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that
chain programs cannot as a practical matter be continued in the face
of such liabilities. It was in the face of such liabilities that chain pro-
grams were established, developed and expanded to their present pro-
portions.8 0 Those who brought about chain programs have found that
sq. If the speaker at the microphone is privileged to utter defamatory statements
the radio station operator is prima facie entitled to the same privilege. Irwin v. Ash.
urst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. (2d) 1127 (1938). For further discussion of the problem of
privilege, see infra pp. 289-292.
6o. Such liability was specifically imposed in Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co.,
8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. i934). Not a trace of judicial authority to the contrary has
been found.
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the incentive of profit from such operations greatly outweighs any
deterrents attributable to the risk of the attached liabilities.
In the absence of special considerations of privilege which may
on particular occasions be found applicable,61 similar considerations are
pertinent as applied to the broadcasting of unsupervised utterances
spoken into microphones at current happenings such as athletic events,
banquet hall programs and proceedings at political conventions.
c. Telephone analogy continues inappropriate
It may be added that the development toward automatic transmis-
sion in radio broadcasting does not tend to replace the newspaper anal-
ogy with the telephone analogy as the basis for the radio station's liabil-
ity for defamation where the manuscript is deliberately dispensed with.
Three conspicuous aspects in which the telephone is distinguishable from
radio on the question of liability for defamation have been historically
identifiable. In the first place telephonic transmission was automatic,
while in radio broadcasting the operations of the broadcaster were joined
with the voice of the speaker at the microphone in order to secure effec-
tive transmission. In the second place, the telephone company under the
law of public utilities is a common carrier of messages, obligated as such
to provide message transmission service for senders. The radio broad-
casting company is under no such common carrier obligation. The
whole background of policy is thus strikingly different in the two cases.
In the third place, the need of innocent victims for redress against
defamation by radio is infinitely more urgent that it is against defama-
tion by telephone. As said by Judge Otis: "the telephone company
* but carries a message (in a sealed envelope, as it were) from the
sender to a single person. The operator of the broadcasting station
publishes the message to the world. If this distinction is a practical
one rather than theoretical, it is nevertheless a most significant distinc-
tion and quite enough to support an entirely different measure of respon-
sibility." 62 Without further exposition,63 it is readily apparent that
the different policy consideration as between telephone and radio would
still persist, due solely to the second and third distinctions mentioned,
quite irrespective of how automatic the process of transmission in radio
broadcasting may become.
5. Where an Outside Speaker without Warning Interpolates
Defamatory Utterances in Broadcast of Manuscript That Is
Unobjectionable
Under the foregoing three types of broadcasting facts the elements
both of intention and policy leave the newspaper analogy intact as the
61. See itfra pp. 289-292.
62. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 89o (W. D. Mo. 1934).
63. This matter is examined at greater length in Vold, supra note i5, at 648-652.
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appropriate basis for the liability of radio stations for defamatory broad-
casts irrespective how automatic the process of transmission may
become. The foregoing three types of facts include, be it noted, most
of the actual broadcasting that currently takes place.
Is there adequate reason for the contention that another rule
should be substituted in the case of impromptu defamatory interpola-
tions by outside speakers in the broadcast of submitted manuscripts that
are found unobjectionable?
a. Asserted bases for distinguishing interpolation cases
It may be admitted that in interpolation cases, if transmission is
in substance automatic, the radio station has neither the specific inten-
tion to participate in the transmission of defamatory interpolations nor
the opportunity to guard against the defamatory utterance. There-
fore, the interpolation case may superficially seem to be distinguishable,
in that here is seemingly neither intentional nor negligent publication
by the radio station.6 4 While such distinctions on first impression may
seem plausible, they are readily shown to lack convincing force.
b. The external physical facts involved in publication show no
distinction in interpolation cases
In the first place, the external operations of intentional participa-
tion by the radio station in the process of broadcasting are precisely
the same in the transmission of interpolations as they are in the trans-
mission of words read from manuscript regardless of how automatic
the process of transmission may become. The station operates the
apparatus by means of which the words uttered into the microphone
are transmitted as radio emanations capable of actuating the
receiving mechanisms located in the receiving sets of listeners.6 5
Without the radio station's operation of the broadcasting apparatus,
the generator, the transmitter, and their controls, there would be
no broadcast, whether of manuscript or of interpolations. It there-
fore seems deceptive to characterize the broadcasting of inter-
polations as the activity of persons other than the station and to call
the imposition of liability upon the station an insurer's burden for
another's wrong.66 On the contrary, the actual fact is that the radio
station by its operation of the broadcasting apparatus is a participator
64, The leading "sources" for the promulgation of such views on the subject of in-
terpolation are referred to, with some critical comment, in notes 24 and-25 supra.
65. Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650 (1936);
Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934) ; Sorensen v.
Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (932), 82 A. L. R. iio6 (1933). See also note 56
supra.
66. Brief for Appellant, pp. 50, 63, 64, 66, Su'mit Hotel C y. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 8 A. (2d) 3o2 (Pa. 1939). Similar forasi'of expression ire found in the con-
tributions criticised in note 24 supra.
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in the broadcasts. 67  When liability for such broadcasts is imposed
upon the radio station as a participator therein, it is being held liable
for its own acts, not for the acts of another.
Equally unjustified on the actual facts of current broadcasting is
the assertion that radio broadcasting is analogous to the situation where
a speaker rents a hall or auditorium 68 in which the speech he makes
turns out to be defamatory, or that it is analogous to the same situation
with the added fact that the hall or auditorium thus rented is effec-
tively designed from the standpoint of acoustics 69 or provided with
an automatic loudspeaker system.70  In those familiar situations, unlike
radio broadcasting, the owner of the hall does not, by operating the
transmission apparatus, actively participate in the transmission of the
words uttered but merely turns his physical facilities over to the
67. The dictum by Judge Otis in Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp.
889, 89o (W. D. Mo. 1934), is directly in point: "I assume a sudden utterance by him
of defamatory words not included in the manuscript, an utterance so quickly made as to
render impossible its prevention; I assume, in short, a complete absence of negligence
on the part of the owner of the station . . . The conclusion seems inescapable that
the owner of the station is liable. It is he who broadcasted the defamation. He took
the utterance of the speaker which came to him in the form of pulsations in the air.
Those waves of air he changed into electrical impulses. Them he threw out upon the
ether knowing they would be caught up by thousands and changed again into sound
waves and into a human voice. He intended to do these things . . . The case here
certainly is not like that in which one only provides another with an instrumentality
which that other, all unsuspected by him who furnished it, uses to inflict injury. Here
the instrumentality is operated by the owner for another who has hired him to operate
it." See also notes 56 and 65 srupra.
68. This argument was made by Mr. Maxwell V. Beghtol, the alert attorney for
the broadcasting station in the case of Sorenren v. Wood. "We are in exactly the same
situation as the man who owns a hall, or an auditorium. Suppose you own a hall, rent
it out for public meetings . . . ." Taken from defendant station's argument to the
jury, Bill of Exceptions, p. 248. The Nebraska Court rejected this view of the facts,
however, and applied the newspaper analogy. The case of Coffey v. Midland Broad-
casting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 89o (W. D. Mo. 1934), explicitly rejected the view stated
in the text and stated that the instrumentality is operated by the owner for another who
has hired him to operate it. See note 67 supra. Nevertheless, this argument was again
repeated in Brief for Intervening Appellant, pp. 23, 26, Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 3o2 (Pa. 1939).
69. J. C. Hardgrove, attorney for a broadcasting station, in remarks before the
American Law Institute. 12 PRoc. A. L. I. 357-358 (1935). This line of thought was
disapproved in the opinion of Justice Brandeis in Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co.,
283 U. S. 191, 201 (1931).
7o. This same point had already earlier been urged by Mr. Beghtol, as attorney for
the broadcasting station at the second appeal in Sorensen v. Wood (No. 28749, unre-
ported, 1933). "If the owner of a megaphone permits some person to use it for the
purpose of so increasing the sound of the voice that a speech may be made to a large
audience can it be said that the owner of the megaphone in the absence of negligence
or collusion is absolutely liable for defamatory statements made during the speech?"
Brief for Appellant, p. I4. It was also urged by Mr. J. C. Hardgrove, as cited in note
69 supra, at 358.
After the loudspeaker analogy had been thus proclaimed by attorneys for broad-
casting stations it was echoed by Professor Bohlen in Fifty Years of Torts (937) 5o
HARv. L. REv. 725, 731, and on his authority in turn echoed by the Pennsylvania Court
in the case of Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 3o8 (Pa.
1939). Mr. Beghtol's ideas in Sorensen v. Wood, though not approved by the Nebraska
Court to which they were submitted, where defamation involves absolute liability, have
thus now by way of Hardgrove and Bohlen found their way to approval by the Penn-
sylvania Court where the court says the liability for defamation in that state involves
only a high standard of care.
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speaker's use. They are therefore more nearly comparable to the
supplying of pen and paper, or to the rental of cars in the "drive your-
self" automobile business. In current radio broadcasting on the other
hand, the radio station by its own employees operates the apparatus of
transmission. Under the Federal Radio Act, moreover, no one else
may lawfully operate it. It may be granted, of course, that it is pos-
sible to install a regular radio broadcasting system with appropriate
loudspeakers attached to receiving sets in a hall or auditorium to take
the place of the familiar automatic loudspeaker system. If this is what
is actually done, the radio station operator in that case by his operation
of the transmission apparatus is of course just as much a participator
in producing the transmission that results as he is Jn other situations
where radio transmission is utilized. So long as the proper functioning
of radio transmission apparatus requires such degree and extent of con-
tinuous attention as to make necessary the supervision of the radio
station's own trained employees, it seems abundantly clear that courts
describe the facts with substantial accuracy when they say that the
instrumentality is operated by the owner for another who has hired him
to operate it.7
1
c. The element of intentional publication is readily found in
interpolation cases
In the second place, as to the element of intentional publication,
it can be readily recognized that in interpolation cases, as in cases where
the manuscript is deliberately dispensed with, the radio station neces-
sarily has a general intention to transmit the words the speaker utters
into the microphone. Though the station expects the speaker to follow
the previously submitted manuscript, it knows full well that not the
words in the manuscript but the words actually uttered are the words
that will be transmitted by its broadcasting operations. It also knows
full well that when outside speakers are given access to its microphone
departures from the manuscript can occur at any time. It necessarily
71. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 890 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
It can also be granted that the further the radio broadcasting process dispenses with
manual modulation and the further the automatic loudspeaker system is expanded into
complicated apparatus requiring ever more attention to keep it properly adjusted and
in working order, the closer will the two approach each other as a matter of degree in
regard to participation with the speaker in their use. It was long ago said by the emi-
nent jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, that most differences in kind were at the border-
lines reducible to differences in degree. In current commercial broadcasting the radio
station operator admittedly operates the delicately adjusted and complicated broadcast-
ing apparatus by means of which transmission of the speaker's utterances at the micro-
phone to listeners at receiving sets is effected. This is not true at the present time of
the automatic loudspeakers with which the public is generally familiar. If the point
should be reached where loudspeakers in this regard become in effect like broadcasting
apparatus now is, requiring a trained operator to keep them functioning while in use,
can it honestly be said that such operator is not a participant in the transmission that
results ?
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intends that chances as to what is broadcast shall be taken when it thus
knowingly and voluntarily for its own convenience or profit participates
with outside speakers over whom it knows it has no immediate and
direct control.7 2  One way of describing the actual facts as to intention
is that the radio station in such cases necessarily intends to transmit
the words the outside speaker may utter into the microphone, but that
it is willing to take chances of improper statements because of its
belief, reasonably entertained, that the speaker will follow the manu-
script submitted. In other words, the radio station's intention to trans-
mit the words uttered by the speaker is motivated by its reasonable
belief that those words will be the words found in the submitted manu-
script.73 Another possible way of putting it is to say that the radio
station here has a double intention, to transmit the words uttered by
the speaker and to transmit the words contained in the manuscript, that
it supposes that these two aspects of its intention will coincide, while
in interpolation cases they actually diverge.74  So far as the mere
technical element of intention on the part of the radio station is con-
cerned, therefore, the actual facts in interpolation cases reveal abundant
basis for holding as a matter of law that the radio station is as com-
pletely an intentional participator in the transmission of the interpola-
tion as it is in any other part of the broadcast.75
72. That radio broadcasters fully realize the presence of the risk of impromptu
interpolations when outsiders are admitted to their microphones is readily apparent from
the circumstance that, from the very first, arguments about the basis for liability of
broadcasting stations have constantly emphasized the risk of interpolation. Indeed, that
is the principal reason usually given to support the broadcaster's claim that the newspaper
analogy is inappropriate for radio stations. See the works criticized in note" 24 supra.
See also the discussion before the American Law Institute, 12 PRoc. A. L. I. 355-363
(1935) ; 14 id. 73-89 (1937). If all broadcasters and their protagonists on other occa-
sions are thus keenly aware of the risk of interpolation when the question of liability
is under discussion, are they not also equally aware of that risk of interpolation when
they admit outsiders to their microphones? The answer clearly must be "yes".
73. The problem of what they intended to broadcast is thus very similar to the
familiar problem often encountered in other parts of the law when it becomes important
to distinguish between intention and motive.
74. A comparable situation in the law of sales is described by Professor Williston
as follows: ". . . if goods are ordered by mail by a fraudulent person, the name of a re-
sponsible buyer being used as a fraudulent means of inducing the seller to send forward
the goods, the seller's primary intent is to sell the goods to the person whose name ap-
pears to be signed to the letter. The seller also intends to sell the goods to the person
who wrote the letter. He believes that these two intentions are harmonious because he
believes the persons are one and the same. As they are not the same, both intentions
cannot be made effectual. . . ." 2 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 635. The mat-
ter is conveniently illustrated for sales transactions in the case of Phelps v. McQuade,
220 N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 441 (1917).
75. Accordingly, the form of definition of what constitutes publication, adopted by
the American Law Institute, by its own terms, applies to the radio station which has
actively participated by its operations in the "communication intentionally" of the matter
which was defamatory. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 577.
The hesitation manifested by the Institute over this conclusion, as appears from the
discussions at the Annual Meetings which resulted in its caveat attached to § 577, tak-
ing no position either way as to interpolation, was based much less on any clear cut
analysis of the operative facts involved in the process of broadcasting than it was on
arguments over to what extent it was wise policy to apply the absolute liability of
defamation to the business of radio broadcasting under such circumstances. See 12
Paoc. A. L. I. 355-363 (1935) ; 14 id. at 73-89 (1937).
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It is apparent, therefore, that the argument from asserted lack of
intention to publish, as an independent matter, is without merit. That
argument merely serves as emotional pavement for the contention that
there is something unfair or unjust in holding the radio station to
strict liability for such intentional publication in interpolation cases.
To that aspect of the argument we accordingly turn.
d. Considerations of fairness and policy: equality with newspapers;
danger to victims
Protagonists for broadcasting stations have insistently repeated the
palpably misleading assertion that because of the instantaneous char-
acter of the transmission that results, the radio station is in interpola-
tion cases in an entirely different position from the newspaper which
can check the copy for defamatory matter before it is released for pub-
lication. 76 Such protagonists are wont to assert as unanswerable logic
that this difference between the two types of publication renders it
unjust to apply to both the same strict liability. It is asserted that the
newspaper by the use of due care in proofreading and checking copy can
protect itself against liability, whereas the radio station is utterly help-
less in case of defamatory interpolation by outside speakers given access
to the microphone.
Such misleading assertions rest upon a misconception, readily
exposed, of the range of the newspaper's liability. In the law of defama-
tion the leading case of Hulton v. Jones 77 is a familiar landmark.
Another case of the same type, even closer to the present problem, is
Morrison v. Ritchie & Co.78  Under cases of this type it is well estab-
lished that a newspaper is answerable at its peril for the defamatory
meaning reasonably understood by readers of the paper because of
extrinsic facts known to the readers, but not discoverable by the news-
paper even by the exercise- of the highest degree of care.79 Moreover,
as said by Judge Otis, "He knows that without any fault of him or of
any of his employees someone sometime surreptitiously may insert in
his paper some line of libel. He takes that risk." 80 Further still, even
by the exercise of the utmost practicable degree of care, it is impossible
for newspaper copy readers, not learned in the law, to detect and elim-
76. This contention was apparently first given general currency in the year 1927,
before any of the judicial decisions on the subject had been made. In that year this
contention made its appearance in DAvis, LAW OF RADIO COMMUNICATION (Ist ed. 1927)
164, 168-17o. For superficial plausibility in the statement of this contention this work
far surpasses most of its later published echoes. For some observations thereon, see
note 24 supra. This contention was rejected by the Nebraska Court in Sorensen v.
Wood.
77. [i9io] A. C. 20.
78. 4 Sess. Cas. 645 (i9o2). Other very familiar cases are Peck v. Tribune Co.,
214 U. S. 185 (199) and Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U. S. 290 (1919).
79. For further authorities and citation to analytical discussion, see note 53 supra.
So. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 89o (W. D. Mo. I934).
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inate every instance of language that may by courts be held to be
defamatory.8' It therefore is not true, as asserted by protagonists for
the radio station, 2 that the newspaper in all instances can protect itself
by the use of due care while radio stations in interpolation cases
cannot.83 In this regard, therefore, newspapers and radio stations,
instead of being "entirely different", are in reality closely similar. In
the ordinary course each maintains practical control over the content
published. In the case of each, occasional situations are presented where
no exercise of care, however great, can completely guard against the
transmission of defamation. The risk of liability involved in such
situations is part of the burden of the enterprise in which both are
engaged. The hardship upon the publisher which is involved in strict
liability under the law of defamation is therefore not notably different
in the two cases.
It may be granted, however, that because of the ease with which
interpolations may be made, the range of situations where due care
may prove unavailing to exclude defamatory utterances may be some-
what wider in the case of the radio than in the case of the newspaper.
To the extent that this may be true, the innocent victim of defamatory
utterances is more largely exposed by operation of radio broadcasting
than he is by publication through the press. To that extent, therefore,
the victim's need for protection against "character assassination" by
radio is markedly greater than it is in the case of newspaper publica-
tion. 4 Relieving the participating radio station from strict liability
8z. This aspect of the question is examined at greater length in Vold, supra note
15, at 63x-632.
82. Despite the well-known law on the subject, briefs for radio stations have per-
sistently repeated the palpable misstatement criticized in the text. "Nothing can appear
in the paper as printed except as a result of the intention or negligence of the publish-
er." Brief for Appellant, p. 56, Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A.
(2d) 302 (Pa. 1939). "In the case of the newspaper, defamatory words can be pub-
lished only if there has been wilful wrongdoing or negligence on the part of some one
or more employees of the publisher." Brief for Intervening Appellant, p. 4, Summit
Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 3o2 (Pa. 1939).
83. The statement in the text has reference, of course, to the ordinary jurisdictions
where the law of defamation is understood to involve absolute liability for unprivileged
publication of defamatory utterances. If it be true that in some jurisdictions the law of
defamation involves no such strict liability but is regarded as involving merely a high
degree of care, as was stated recently by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Summit
case, the statement in the text does not apply in such a jurisdiction. See note 2 supra. If
such be the basis of liability for defamation under the law of the jurisdiction, both news-
paper and radio station can avoid liability by the exercise of due care. Thus, again, the
two types of publication continue to be closely analogous.
84. This matter is dealt with at greater length in Vold, supra note x5, at 611, 633.
In addition, see note zoo infra.
For the field of aviation the corresponding problem was phrased by Professor
Bohlen as follows: "Judge Lynn in a brief but able opinion turned the defendant's bat-
tery upon himself. In substance, he said that, if there was such likelihood that a plane
would get out of control notwithstanding the utmost care in its management or prepara-
tion, flying is so dangerous an activity that it should be conducted at the risk of the
flier and not of the surface owner over whose land the flight is made and who has no
interest in it whatever." Bohlen, Aziation Under the Common Law (1934) 48 HAv.
L. REV. 216.
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does not avoid the injury threatened but merely results in relieving the
perpetrator at the expense of the innocent victim. On the subject of
hardship, too, it is to be remembered that the radio station very readily
can protect itself without sacrificing its victim by requiring indemnity
from the advertiser in whose interest it transmits the defamatory utter-
ances. On the other hand, in many if not in most instances, there is no
practicable relief for the innocent victim if his redress against the par-
ticipating radio station is denied.85
There is no duty imposed upon the radio station to admit outside
advertisers to its microphone at all. The station knows full well that
when it does so, it thereby takes the chances of transmitting defamatory
interpolations to the injury of innocent victims. It takes those chances
intentionally.86 Under such circumstances, and especially in view of
the fact that it is to the radio station's convenience or profit thus to
participate with outside advertisers at its microphone, how can we
justify shifting the burden of defamatory interpolations from the
perpetrators to the victims? Especially, how can such a shift from
perpetrator to victim be justified, when in all such cases the victim of
such defamation is both passive and helpless while the radio station has
the power readily at hand to provide protection for itself from ultimate
liability for the damage it perpetrates by simply requiring satisfactory
indemnity?
e. Newsvender analogy inappropriate
It is to be noted that in interpolation cases as in other cases the
radio station, jointly with the speaker at the microphone, is a first and
"Assuming that it is a good policy to develop aviation, the good to be gained is the
good of the public. Even assuming that aviation is an essential activity and that it can
be regarded as still in its infancy, there is no reason why the cost of fostering it . . .
should be placed on the individuals over whose land the flights are made and who gain
nothing from the flights save insofar as they are members of the public." Id. at 218.
"So, too, aviation can be subsidized and fostered by relieving it from liability for
those injuries to groundowners which by the confession of counsel in the Dinlop case
cannot be prevented by even the most meticulous care in preparation or flight . . .
It is the public as a whole which has an interest in the development of aviation. The
interest of any particular groundowner is as one of the hundred or more million inhab-
itants of the United States. It is the acme of unequal taxation to make him bear the
whole loss entailed by the destruction of his property through the crashing of a plane
merely because he, as a member of the public, has a hundred-millionth interest in the
development of aviation. But there is nothing to show that a subsidy is needed. Ex-
perience shows that the development of aviation is not substantially impeded by making
it bear the risk of such accidents." Id. at 219.
The close parallel in this regard between aviation and radio is readily apparent.
Taking Professor Bohlen's own words from the start to the finish of these quoted pass-
ages, and substituting the appropriate terms for "radio" instead of "aviation", every
statement made would be as true in the case of radio as in that of aviation.
85. The cases already litigated afford excellent illustrations. In Sorensen v. Wood
the outside speaker at the microphone was a financially irresponsible party. See stipu-
lation filed with the Supreme Court of Nebraska on the second appeal in that case (No.
28749, unreported, 1933). In Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.
D. Mo. 1934) the speaker at the microphone at the central studio in a chain program
was out of the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff resided, the central studio being lo-
cated in New York City while the plaintiff resided in Missouri.
86. See supra pp. 274-275.
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main publisher. There is no publication by anybody until, by the
broadcasting process, the speaker's words are transmitted to radio
listeners simultaneously with their utterance. Accordingly, the news-
vender analogy by its own terms is inapplicable to the radio station. 7
On the technical side, in interpolation cases as in other cases, the radio
station is an intentional participator in the first and main publication.
This matter has already been set out in detail above.88  It is not taking
only a secondary and subordinate part in a later republication of defam-
atory matter already previously published by others.89 On the business
side, as distinguished from the technical side, the radio station is more
clearly in the same general position as the newspaper. Both provide
publication service for advertisers who pay the price therefor as fixed
by private contract. Both are direct competitors in the field of provid-
ing commercial advertising for pay. Both serve the same function
in the advertising field by creating and directing demand for
products. In their economic aspects as business enterprises, quite as
well as in their technical transmission aspects, radio stations are closely
comparable to newspapers as principal publishers of the advertising they
transmit to the public for pay. Accordingly, as an original question,
no showing of due care such as might excuse a newsvender from lia-
bility can in interpolation cases avail the radio station, it being a6
original and principal publisher, as distinguished from a subsequent
republisher who takes only a secondary and subordinate part in a repub-
lication of what has already been previously published by others.90
f. Practical convenience requires a simple rule free from subtle
complications
An important additional reason, bearing on practical convenience
may be added. It is desirable so far as practicable to have a simple
and easily understood rule of liability that can be applied to the practical
situations that arise without becoming incessantly entangled in attenu-
8 . This general matter is dealt with more at length in Vold, supra note i5, at 657-
66o. As there set out, this contention first appeared in one of the briefs for the broad-
casting station in Sorensen v. Wood.
88. See supra pp. 272-275.
89. Accordingly, it does not fall within the language of RESTATEmENT, ToRTs
(1938) § 581, which states the rule applicable to newsvenders. By the very terms of
this section as phrased, it is applicable to dissemination of defamatory matter "which
was originally published by a third person". As to § 581, comment f, the identical lan-
guage there used is applicable to every publisher that falls within the language of § 577.
go. This analogy with regard to publication by radio has never been regarded
favorably by any court. Even the Pennsylvania Court, though in various other direc-
tions favorably disposed toward the contentions of the broadcasting company, refused to
accept this analogy, and cited a relatively early decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, involving radio in a copyright case, as an obstacle to its adoption. Sum-
mit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 309 (Pa. 1939). The later
decision of Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 65o (1936),
it may be added, would seem to settle this aspect of the matter beyond a doubt, as under
that decision it is perfectly clear that a radio broadcasting station is a principal pub-
lisher, being the transmitter of the utterances on the first publication. See infra p. 292.
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ated fact subtleties."1 Where the victims of defamatory utterances can
know nothing of such fact subtleties, rules of law which distinguish
liabilities on such bases readily become pitfalls to injured victims in
their quest for effective redress against wrongdoers.
92
To the radio listener no difference is perceptible between cases
where the manuscript is followed in broadcasting and cases of oral
interpolation. The radio listener does not know whether an advertis-
ing program is put on through the radio station's own announcer or
through outside talent provided by the advertiser. The radio listener
knows nothing of such details as which parties at the studio are in the
employ of the radio station, or whether certain of the radio station's
employees may for the occasion be hired and paid by the advertisers.
The set-up at the studio may involve complicated contractual arrange-
ments among the advertisers whose products are advertised in the
broadcasts, the advertising agencies who arrange for the particular
broadcasts, the talent appearing before the microphone, the radio
station's regular employees who operate the transmission apparatus, and
the owners of the broadcasting station who reap the profits. 98 The
radio listener merely hears the content of the broadcast. The victim
of a defamatory broadcast in the ordinary case has no way of determin-
ing such details.
The newspaper analogy in the law of defamation is admittedly the
appropriate basis for liability for radio broadcasts where defamatory
statements are uttered into the microphone through the station's own
announcer. The same is true where defamatory utterances are con-
tained in manuscripts similarly read into the microphone by outside
speakers, and also where defamatory statements are uttered into the
microphone by outside speakers in programs where written manuscripts
9r. See, for instance, the argument of Donald G. Graham, a lawyer for a broad-
casting station, wherein he deprecates the distinction between slander and libel as ap-
plied to radio broadcasting, and advocates that all defamation by radio be regarded as
libel. "It is difficult to understand why a distinction should be made between an utter-
ance read from a written manuscript and one which is wholly extemporaneous. The
damage is precisely the same in both cases. To designate one as 'libel' and the other
as 'slander' would seem to be carrying fine-spun distinctions too far. A radio listener
cannot possibly know whether what he hears is read or impromptu." Graham, supra
note i9, at 288.
92. It appears, for instance, when the record is examined in the Sumnit case that
the defamed plaintiff when he began his action supposed that the defamatory advertis-
ing program had been put on the air by talent in the employ of the broadcasting station.
His counsel, accordingly, drafted his pleadings that way. At the trial it appeared, how-
ever, that the talent admitted to the microphone were in the employ of an advertising
agency that had arranged for the broadcast. Accordingly, among other matters, de-
fendant station claimed a variance between the pleadings and the proof, which, it was
claimed, was not curable by amendment. Brief for Appellant, pp. 94-IO2, Summit Ho-
tel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302 (Pa. 1939). This technical point
was not passed upon in the opinion of the court in the Summit case.
93. Thus, in the Sumnlt case the talent admitted to the microphone were in the
employ of an advertising agency that arranged for such broadcasts. They were in the
direct employ of neither the radio station nor the advertiser. See note 92 supra.
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are deliberately dispensed with. There is, thus, a simple, well under-
stood and easily applied rule of law as to the liability of radio stations
for defamatory broadcasts covering most of the situations that actually
occur. That rule of law, as already seen, is also techincally appropriate
for the facts involving defamatory interpolations by outside speakers
given access to the microphone. In such cases, too, as already seen,
there is intentional participation in the "communication intentionally"
of the matter that is interpolated, whatever its content may be. All of
the policy considerations, furthermore, that require strict liability in
the interest of security of reputation as an important aspect of general
security are accentuated in the case of defamatory interpolations. More-
over, indemnity* arrangements to throw the ultimate burden in such
cases on the advertiser in whose service the defamatory utterances are
broadcast by the radio station both can and do cover defamatory inter-
polations just as readily as they cover defamatory utterances contained
in submitted manuscripts. As an original question, why in that special
case introduce a mass of complications depending on subtle fact distinc-
tions regarding the arrangements between parties in the studio about
which the victim of the transmitted defamation can know nothing?
Why in that special case introduce such complications, except for the
purpose of obstructing the victim's redress, to the end that radio stations
may escape the strict liability of the law of defamation which applies
to all other types of publishers?
VII. THE REAL POINT: STRICT LIABILITY OR FAULT AS THE
CONTROLLING PRINCIPLE IN LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION
I. The Unsupported Assumption That the Formula of No Liability
without Fault Is Applicable
It would seem that the real substance of the arguments for a milder
rule of liability in the case of interpolations than in the case of other
broadcasts is found neither in the details of fact by which interpolations
differ from other broadcasts, nor in the details of fact bearing upon
how automatic the immediate process of transmission may be. What-
ever there is of substance in those arguments for a milder rule would
seem to lie rather in their starting point, the deep-seated underlying
conception that justice and public policy require that as a general rule
there should be no liability without fault. That familiar conception
seems to be the greatest factor in shaping the appraisal of the facts of
broadcasting and in giving form to arguments advanced in behalf of
radio stations where the aim is to find for them some escape from the
strict liability of defamation applied to all other publishers. In prac-
tically all of these arguments the familiar principle of no liability with-
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out fault is either tacitly assumed or openly avowed as the ultimate cri-
terion of justice to which appeal is made.94 In all this type of discus-
sion substantially the same assertions have appeared with monotonous
regularity, whether the arguments have been directed broadly toward
resting the radio station's liability solely on the negligence basis,9 5
whether they have invoked the variant of the law of negligence which
is found in the newsvender analogy,96 or whether they have tried to
distinguish interpolation cases from other broadcasts in order there
to introduce negligence or the newsvender analogy as the basis for the
radio station's liability.
9
When these arguments are subjected to close analysis, however,
it is readily apparent that in no instance do they go beyond the unsup-
ported assumption from which they start, that no liability without fault
is the general rule of law in the field of torts, which accordingly should
be applied to the radio station. At that point in the discussion the
victim seems to be utterly forgotten. These arguments seldom attempt
to explain why, on the merits, the formula of no liability without fault
should be invoked, thus permitting radio broadcasting to be carried
on at the expense of its victims, 98 instead of the rule of strict liability,
94. The works criticized in note 24 supra afford fair illustrations. The arguments
submitted to the Pennsylvania Court on behalf of the radio station in the Summit case
afford conspicuous instances. "It is a basic principle of general application in the law
of torts that the law imposes no liability without fault." Brief for Appellant, p. 62,
Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302 (Pa. 1939). See also,
generally, id. at 62-68, and an extensive quotation in DAvis, TH. LAW oF RAglo Co-
mUNIcATION (ist ed. 1927) 58-59 (a work criticized in note 24 supra). Long quota-
tions from that treatise to the same effect were also quoted in the Brief for Interven-
ing Appellant, pp. 19, 20, 25, 26, Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A.
(2d) 302 (Pa. 1939).
95. As in the brief submitted for the broadcasting station on the first appeal in
Sorensen v. Wood.
g6. As in the brief submitted for the broadcasting station on the second appeal in
Sorensen v. Wood (No. 28749, unreported, 1933).
97. As in the briefs submitted on behalf of the National Broadcasting Co. and of
the National Association of Broadcasters in the Summit case.
98. Even so outstanding a legal scholar as Professor Bohlen at this vital point
lapses into complete silence. "To my mind we are imposing a heavy enough responsi-
bility upon them if we require them to exercise reasonable care to ascertain that their
facilities will not be and are not being abused." 12 PRoc. A. L. I. 356 (1935) (no rea-
son for this view stated). "To . . . make the broadcasting company liable for an
unknown and unknowable interpolation even if they stop the broadcast as soon as the
defamatory character of the thing had become apparent, I think is going far beyond
any analogy properly to be drawn to the newspaper publisher." 14 id. at 86 (1937) (no
reason for this view stated). "It would seem that justice would be done and the good
reputation of mankind given sufficient protection by treating the broadcaster as a dis-
seminator rather than a publisher of the defamatory interpolation." Bohlen, mupra
note 70, at 731 (no reason for this view stated).
The present writer ventures the inference that the actual explanation for these
views on Professor Bohlen's part in effect appears in another place, as follows: "It is
impossible to enter into the causes which led to the astounding revolution in the judi-
cial idea of justice whereby the old concept, that one who did harm should pay for it
because he caused it, gave place to the concept that it would be unjust to transfer the
harm which had befallen one innocent party to one equally innocent merely because the
first was a passive victim while the other had actively caused the damage. . . . But
it may be said with some confidence that the conception concerned itself entirely with
the injustice of requiring an innocent author of harm to answer for it. . . . An en-
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which is applicable to other publishers, under which the publishers who
create the risks and reap the profits of the activity which brings about
defamation of others are also required to bear its burdens. When
reduced to their lowest terms these arguments amount merely to the
unsupported assertion that the formula of no liability without fault
is the general rule of tort law applicable to all new situations as they
arise.
2. The Fallacy Involved in Such Assumption
The fundamental fallacy in such assumption is readily exposed.
Wide areas of the vast field of tort law present other bases for liability
tirely new system of jurisprudence might well contain, as a fundamental principle, the
conception that liability to repair harm done is only to be imposed as a species of pun-
ishment for misconduct, moral or social. . . . And while in new actions fault was
regarded as essential to recovery, it was still required because it was thought more just
to leave the loss where it had fallen than to single out the innocent defendant as the
victim simply because he was the author of the loss." BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW
OF TORTS (1926) 436-439. In a footnote to these passages Professor Bohlen expands
his viewpoint as follows: "The natural tendency in any advancing civilization, to re-
gard the utmost possible freedom of individual activity as essential to the general good,
would therefore cause its encouragement to be regarded as paramount to the preserva-
tion of the interests of the merely passive citizen; and would tend to the abandonment
of a rule of liability which, by making the actor answerable for all the harm he causes,
would appear to unduly burden and so discourage individual initiative, and to the adop-
tion in place thereof of a rule which relieved him from liability so long as he in his
activities showed a due regard for the interests of others." Id. at 438, n. 49.
These quotations appear in the same article and are parts of the same exposition
by Professor Bohlen, which is cited by the Pennsylvania Court in Summit Hotel Co.
v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 308 (Pa. 1939), for the broad proposi-
tion that tort liability must be founded upon some blameworthy conduct, or lack of due
care resulting in the violation of a duty owing to others.
It can be readily noticed that these views of Professor Bohlen substantially coin-
cide with the views expressed in Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442 (1873) in rejecting
the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868) as authority. That this en-
tire viewpoint is both historically unsound and philosophically indefensible, see quota-
tion from Roscoe Pound, appearing in note io stupra, and POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF
LEGAL HisTORy (1923) 105-109. See also citations there listed of studies touching the
subject of absolute liability.
That Professor Bohlen is personally inclined to apply these views not only in the
traditionally familiar field of negligent conduct but also in the field of defamation
seems clear from the following: "For some curious reason one's interest in one's un-
blemished reputation has, from the time that defamation was taken over by the King's
Court, been given an extraordinary extent of protection. There is perhaps this much
justification for it. . . . Apart from this there seems very little reason to hold the
publisher of a newspaper liable for the innocent insertion of a matter which sometimes
is little more than uncomplimentary at the very most, unless some substantial and tan-
gible damage has resulted from it." Bohlen, supra note 70, at 730-731. That on the
merits the formula of no liability without fault has no such place in the field of defama-
tion, however, see note 46 supra, quoting from a careful analysis of the problem by
Professor Jeremiah Smith.
With regard to aviation, however, Professor Bohlen has himself taken the view that
as an original question absolute liability is properly applied. See excerpts quoted in
note 84 supra. The formula of "no liability without fault", then does not have such
universality of application in controlling novel situations that arise as Professor Boh-
len's exposition in his STrUrES IN THE LAW OF TORTS would indicate. In addition, see
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §§ 519, 520. It would be interesting to know what are
Professor Bohlen's actual reasons for distinguishing between the propriety as an orig-
inal question of absolute liability in aviation crash cases and the propriety as an orig-
inal question of absolute liability in defamation cases. As indicated in note 84 supra,
every word of his exposition of absolute liability for aviation crash cases is equally
applicable to the facts of defamation by radio.
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than negligence. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the
law of defamation itself is a branch of strict liability, not of negli-
gence, and that outside of the law of defamation is a wide and rapidly
developing area of strict liability for so-called extra-hazardous activities
which are not matters of common usage.9 The law of negligence has
never in the common law system been the basis for liability for inten-
tional publication of defamatory utterances. 4On the other hand, strict
liability for intentional publication of unprivileged defamatory utter-
ances has in modern times been increasingly accentuated as the methods
and range of publication for such utterances have become increasingly
far-reaching and dangerous. With the advent of radio broadcasting
the danger in this respect to innocent victims is greatly increased.' 00
99. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §§ 519, 520.
ioo. This simple fact is so familiar as to amount to matter of common knowledge.
Nevertheless, a few specifications may be in order by way of authentication.
"Statements are being made over the radio constantly which no newspaper could
print even if it so desired. Yet these statements continue to be made oftentimes by
irresponsible persons and defamation which they speak is cast upon the highways of the
sky to be heard by millions of listeners. . . . The permanence of the written record
over the evanescent spoken word has been, we believe, exaggerated. We Americans
have become in the last twenty-five years decidedly ear-minded, as the salesman of
advertising time on the radio will eloquently convince you. The, growing feeling,
therefore, that defamation by radio is as heinous as written defamation is not to be
denied." Keller, Federal Control of Defamation by Radio (x936) 12 NoT=E DAME
LAwY. 15, 19.
"Radio has opened up a new and larger opportunity for defamation than has ever
existed before. . . . Modern invention has thus arised as an ally of defamation, and
if man's ingenuity continues at its present rate, the vehicles for libel and slander will
continue to increase. Television will certainly not lessen the effectiveness of a defama-
tory imputation. . . . A torrid political campaign is being waged in the city where
the broadcast station is located. The most effective way of reaching the largest num-
ber of voters is over the air. . . . A strike is on . . . Broadcast stations are
called upon to broadcast programs of one side or the other, or both. Such programs
usually involve, in addition to comments on the issues, more or less direct and inflam-
matory criticism of individuals." Graham, supra note 49, at 283.
"The State's Attorney of Chicago listening to the radio in his own home recently
had the doubtful pleasure of hearing himself mentioned as one of those present at the
cabaret from which the music was broadcasted and where, according to reports, the
Volstead law was being violated. A description of a diastrous fire at a named hotel,
though the announcer has stated that the occurrence is purely fictitious and without
the slightest basis in fact, may well mislead those who 'tune in' while the description
is being broadcasted and may result in numerous cancellations of reservations and
great financial loss to the hotel. . . . On the mischief side, radio defamation cer-
tainly would seem to be more like libel than like slander." ZOLLMAx, LAw OF THE
Aia (i92) 124, 125. See Vold, supra note 15, at 633, 643-644.
"The operator of the broadcasting station publishes the message to the world."
Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 88, 89o (W. D. Mo. 1934).
The pleadings in Sorensen v. Wood disclose that between the hours of six and
seven o'clock P. M., when the defamatory utterances were broadcast, the station had
a radio audience of at least 200,000 individuals in Nebraska as well as numerous listen-
ers in adjoining states, matters not controverted by the defendant station. The record
of testimony in that case discloses that the manuscript there broadcast was rejected by
several daily papers because of its defamatory character.
The record in the case of Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A.
(2d) 302 (Pa. 1939) (Record, p. r41a), shows an oral stipulation between counsel in
that case that the particular broadcast involving the defamatory utterance there in
question was carried over twenty-six different radio stations extending from New
York on the east coast to Bismarck, North Dakota. The supplemental record in that
case shows that the contract with the advertiser called for a hookup with forty-seven
stations throughout the country all the way from Boston, Mass., and Miami, Florida,
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Moreover, in our own time in this country the prevalent conceptions of
public policy have been increasingly emphasizing the interests of general
security and calling for increased protection against the injurious con-
duct of others even in areas of conduct where formerly it was regarded
as not legally improper to inflict damage upon others as a result of care-
ful conduct.10' So far as underlying considerations of policy are con-
cerned, therefore, should the courts now yield to the arguments in behalf
of radio stations and substitute some variant of the law of negligence
for the strict liability for defamation which is applicable as a matter
of course to other publishing enterprises, they would be taking a very
conspicuous step backwards. So far as the question of policy is con-
cerned, the considerations which have required the application of strict
liability in defamation cases even in the heyday of the much overrated
formula of no liability without fault are clearly present in the field of
radio transmission which is the strongest and most effective, farflung
and dangerous publishing enterprise the world has even seen.
3. Policy Considerations Support Application of Strict Liability
Dismissing all technical inquiries, the answer to the question of
whether it is socially advantageous to relieve the radio station from
the same strict liability for defamation that is applicable to other pub-
lishers should be negative. As set forth more at length in another
to Los Angeles and San Francisco in California, and Portland, Oregon, and Seattle,
Washington. Brief for Appellee, pp. 57-59.
It is within the recent memory of many thousands that the broadcast on a na-
tional hookup of Orson Welles' fanciful play, depicting an invasion of this country by
an army of supermen from the planet Mars who wrought havoc with the City of New
York and quickly destroyed the nation's military force which was sent against them,
caused an enormous amount of consternation and shock to listeners throughout the
country.
In view of such uncontroverted facts as the foregoing, which are only samples,
can the self-serving declarations by radio stations in their briefs that defamation by
radio is so slight as to be inconsequential be accepted as true? Brief for Intervening
Appellant, pp. 21, 25, Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,,8 A. (2d) 302
(Pa. 1939). The facts being what they actually are, do such self-serving declarations
from broadcasting stations gain any added weight from the Pennsylvania Court's dic-
turn in the Sieninit case, id. at 30, that "The radio word is quickly spoken, and, gen-
erally, as quickly forgotten"? Further, to be even consistent in their contentions on
this matter, how can radio stations in the same breath claim that there is no serious
danger to victims from defamation by radio and yet claim that imposing upon radio
stations responsibility for the defamatory utterances which they do broadcast imposes
extremely dangerous burdens upon radio stations? See also infra p. 295.
Ioi. See material quoted and authorities cited in notes io and 98 supra. See also
Vold, supra note io, at 231-240, 244-249.
"Even more significant is the course of American decision since Professor Boh-
len's paper was written. . . . But the tide began to turn while he was writing and
in the past decade three courts have accepted it while but one has repected it. .... "
"Presently the exigencies of the general security led courts to adopt the rule [of Ry-
lands v. Fletcher] in several jurisdictions where the question remained open ...
.. If so, it marks a reaction from the doctrine that liability is to exist only
as a corollary of culpability. It subjects the land-owner to a liability at his peril, in
the interest of the general security." POUND, INTERPRETATIONs OF LEGAL HisToRy
(1923) 107-109.
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place, 10 2 "whether viewed from the standpoint of equality before the
law, protection to innocent victims, cause of the damage, profit from
the operations involved, onesidedness of the risks concerned, ability to
bear the loss, ability to prevent its perpetration, or ability to
arrange for self-protection through indemnity or insurance, the same
conclusion from the standpoint of justice reappears. That conclusion
is that radio broadcasting publishers are not entitled to greater favors
than other publishers, and that no reason is apparent from the stand-
point of justice why in their interest innocent and helpless victims
should be sacrificed. When broadcasters and their passive innocent
victims are regarded together as parts of the single picture that is
viewed, it seems little less than presumptuous to claim in a court of
justice that the risk of 'character assassination' created by the com-
mercial activity of broadcasting stations ought, to the greater advantage
of such stations, to be thrown on their passive and innocent victims."
4. The Same Policy Considerations Apply to Oral Interpolations
All these policy considerations are as applicable to broadcasts of
defamatory oral interpolations as to broadcasts of defamatory manu-
scripts. The danger and the damage to the victim is not less because it
is an interpolation. The risk of possible interpolation is knowingly
and deliberately created by the radio station's admitting the outside
speaker to its microphone and participating with him in making the
broadcast. That risk the radio station as a practical matter can very
readily avoid or greatly reduce by requiring adequate indemnification
from the advertiser whose speaker is admitted to the microphone. In
this regard too, strict liability is the best possible assurance that the
highest practicable care will be exercised both by radio stations and
their advertisers to avoid such mishaps.103 Under the newspaper
analogy in defamation as the general basis for the radio station's lia-
bility, already applied by the courts of several jurisdictions to the other
types of broadcasting situations that have been adjudicated, the practice
among radio stations has already become widespread to require indem-
nity from the advertiser before admitting the outside speaker to the
microphone. Can it be contended that interpolation cases in this respect
do not call for the same protection for innocent victims? Can it be con-
tended that indemnity arrangements cannot as readily include defama-
tory interpolations as defamatory contents of written manuscripts? As
a matter of fact, the indemnity provisions already familiar in broad-
i02. Void, ,nipra note 15, at 63o-63i. See generally, id. at 626-639.
103. That the rule as applied to broadcasting actually has a very salutary effect
in preventing irresponsible publication of defamatory utterances, see quotation from
the article by McDonald and Grimshaw, supra note 49.
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casting practice actually do cover interpolations.1 0 4 Under the news-
paper analogy as already announced in the available judicial decisions,
therefore, the ultimate burden of defamatory interpolations not only
can be but is thrown upon the advertiser who supplies them and in
whose service they are broadcast. Relaxing the strict liability of radio
stations in cases of interpolations, therefore, would serve principally
to shift that ultimate burden from the advertiser to the victim and
thereby greatly increase the incentive to perpetrate defamation. As
in the case of the broadcast of defamatory manuscripts so in the case
of defamatory interpolations, application of the strict liability of the
law of defamation assures that those who create the risks and reap the
commercial profits from the publication of defamatory utterances are
also required to bear the burdens of damage which such activity inflicts
upon their passive and innocent victims. Such has been the traditional
view of what is sound public policy in the field of defamatory utter-
ances. No reason is apparent, and none has been suggested, why this
broad public policy should be different with regard to defamatory
utterances transmitted by radio than for defamatory utterances trans-
mitted through the older familiar modes of publication.10 5
io4. See the language of standard forms of such contracts now in general use, as
set forth in note 48 supra. Another form of such contract clause, also said to be in
general use, is quoted in Keller, supra note ioo, at 158.
105. ". . . the novelty of the means used does not lessen the duty of the courts
to give full protection. . . ." Brandeis, J., in Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co.,
283 U. S. 191, igS (93) (a copyright case). So far as the present writer is aware,
protagonists for radio stations have never in their public pronouncements or publica-
tions directly faced this question. Instead they have made the unsupported assumption
that "no liability without fault" is the general criterion of liability. See supra p. 281.
The nearest approach to any definite reason why the rules of negligence rather than
the rules of defamation ought to be applied to radio broadcasting, is the asserted opinion
that such liability "unduly penalizes a totally new and different form of communication".
Brief for Appellant, p. 45, Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d)
302 (Pa. 1939), and echoed in the court's opinion at p. 311 without further elucidation
or supporting data other than a reference to Mr. Guider's assertion, already mentioned
in note 24 supra. This, again, is in substance merely another form of words for Pro-
fessor Bohlen's "To my mind we are imposing a heavy enough responsibility upon
them if we require them to exercise reasonable care to ascertain that their facilities
will not be and are not being abused". 12 Paoc. A. L. I. 356 (1935). This excerpt,
too, had been quoted to the Pennsylvania Court in the Brief for Interevening Appel-
lant, p. 6, Summit case, supra.
Even when the contention is phrased in this form, however, the protagonists for
radio stations have been unable to adduce even the slightest factual data in its support.
The reason for the total absence of supporting data for the assertion that the law of
defamation imposes an unreasonably heavy burden upon the radio industry was briefly
expressed by Chief Justice Goss, in Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 357, 243 N. W.
82, 86 (932), as follows: "For it appears that the opportunities are so attractive to
investments that the available airways would be greatly overcrowded by broadcasting
stations were it not for restriction of the number of licensees under federal authority."
The leading case on elimination of radio stations because of overcrowding is Federal
Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 (933). The mat-
ter is discussed in greater detail in Void, mtpra note 15, at 635-637.
288 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
5. The Same Policy Considerations Apply in Case of Automatic
Transmission
These policy considerations all continue to be applicable to defama-
tory interpolations in radio broadcasts irrespective of how automatic
the immediate transmission process itself may become. Attempts to
distinguish as a matter of policy between the interpolation case and the
manuscript case on the score of the greater dangers of liability to which
the radio station as publisher may thus become exposed under the strict
liability of the law of defamation 106 are readily met by pointing out
that relieving the radio station from liability does not avoid the actual
dangers of defamatory interpolations in such cases, but merely shifts
the risk of such greater dangers from the active perpetrator to the
passive innocent victim. The greater the actual danger to the radio
station from strict liability in such cases, the greater the victim's need
of protection in such cases.1 0 7
Furthermore, whatever may be the greater danger to the station
in cases of interpolation than in cases of defamatory manuscript, such
danger, is readily guarded against by requirement of an adequate
indemnity provision from the advertiser whose speaker is admitted to
the microphone.
6. The Close Parallel With Ultrahazardous Activities
Moreover, so far as there is any substance to the argument on
behalf of radio stations that the rule of strict liability subjects them to
extremely dangerous liabilities against which they cannot protect them-
selves by the exercise of due care, it tends to establish that the business
io6. A variation of this contention is suggested in the opinion of Kephart, C. J.,
in Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 311 (Pa. 1939), to
the effect that the radio station is thereby exposed to frauds and periuries as gross as
could be practiced in actions of slander. The answer to this suggestion is twofold. In
the first place, the radio station has the same protection against feigned claims afforded
other publishers by the rules of evidence and the ordinary processes of legal pro-
cedure where it may become necessary to distinguish between truth and falsehood.
No showing has ever been made that these are not as adequate for radio stations as
for other parties against whom feigned claims may be asserted. In this respect all
persons are exposed to imposture through the legal doctrine that a contract is legally
binding and enforceable although not evidenced by a writing. In the second place
this danger, whatever it be, is covered under the terms of the indemnity contracts
which good radio broadcasting practice requires in all cases where outside speakers
are admitted to the microphone. See note 49 supra. As a matter of fact, the terms
of such clauses now in general use already cover such claims made on account of
such broadcasts. See the second clause quoted in note 48 supra. A clause of sim-
ilar scope is quoted as one in general use, in Keller, supra note IOO, at 158. It may be
assumed that not even the Pennsylvania Court would take the position that radio sta-
tions should not be answerable for defamation uttered into the microphone by their
own employees. See closing paragraphs of the court's opinion in the Summit case,
supra at 312. Even where the speaker is the radio station's own employee there is
the same opportunity for feigned claims against the radio station as is presented in
any other type of broadcasting.
1O7. See comments on the closely parallel problem in the field of aviation re-
ferred to in note 84 mcpra, and in the last paragraph of note 98 supra.
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of radio broadcasting is in certain respects a business fraught with
great danger to others. Due care is here ineffective to protect the radio
station against liability to injured parties only because due care is here
-neffective to guard against their doing harm to innocent victims. In
this regard, too, the more automatic the immediate process of transmis-
sion becomes, the greater becomes the danger of defamatory interpola-
tions by outsiders admitted to the microphone.
Therefore the facts of radio broadcasting come readily within the
general principles of strict liability applicable to so-called ultrahazardous
activities rather than within negligence principles. The metaphorical
expresson that defamatory utterances may involve "potential dynamite"
vividly pictures the realities. As applied to personal reputation, the
radio broadcasting business, at least where outsiders are given access
to the microphone, is an activity which certainly involves great risk of
serious harm to the victim's personality, a danger which cannot be
eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care.108 Also, such activity is
not such a matter of common usage that it is customarily carried on by
the great mass of mankind, or by many people in the community.109
Moreover, both as to the profits accruing and as to the risks of defama-
tion involved it is an activity which, as between the perpetrators and
their victims, is strictly and wholly one-sided. Therefore, the objections
urged to classifying the radio station as a technical publisher of defama-
tory interpolations where radio transmission is in substance automatic
merely serve to accentuate in such cases the applicability of the broader
grounds for strict liability which are applicable to all ultrahazardous
undertakings not matters of common usage. Those broader grounds
for strict liability also underlie the familiar law of defamation. The
importance of those broader grounds of public policy in the interest of
security of reputation is not reduced but rather greatly accentuated
by those improvements in the transmission technique which greatly
increase the dangers to innocent victims from such defamatory
publications.
VIII. THE QUESTION OF PRIVILEGED OCCASIONS
I. Arguments Confusing Publication and Privilege
Some of the arguments in behalf of a milder rule of liability for
radio stations than for other publishers have confused and beclouded
the discussion by ignoring the well established distinction in the law of
defamation between prima facie liability for publicaton of defamatory
io8. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §§ 519, 520, quoted in note 12 supra.
io9. The close similarity between the situation presented in the case of defamation
by radio and the situations by definition falling within §§ 519 and 52o of the Restate-
ment of Torts, has been noticed in a slightly different connection by Professor Bohlen
himself. 14 PRoc. A. L. I. 164 (937).
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utterances and privileged occasions where for special reasons of policy
liability for such publication is denied. These arguments for freedom
from liability for publication are based on reasons having nothing to
do with questions relating to the facts of publication but concerning
questions of policy bearing upon privilege for certain types of occasions.
Thus, where the policy of facilitating broadcasting of political speeches
is involved, 110 the question manifestly is whether privilege for such
broadcasts should be recognized. So, where public officials in effect
commandeer the services of the station for the purpose of addressing
the public by radio as a means of performing their official duties,'11 the
question is whether a privilege for the station is under such circum-
stances to be recognized.
2. The Application of Privilege to Radio Stationw-Public Duty
to Broadcast
It may be admitted without discussion that if the speaker at the
microphone was privileged, the radio station is entitled to the same
privilege. 1 2 It is also possible that as experience with radio broadcast-
ing increases, certain limited occasions where the reasons for recogniz-
ing a privilege may apply to the radio station without being equally
applicable to the speaker at the microphone may also eventually be dis-
tinguished. Thus, comparably to the privilege of telegraph companies
which are under a public duty to accept and transmit messages not on
their face defamatory, and comparably to the carrying on of an ultra-
hazardous activity in furtherance of a public duty, if a duty to broad-
cast is on some occasion imposed by law, a privilege would follow. It
would seem that where public officials resort to the use of radio broad-
casting in the performance of their public duties the occasion must on
this score be regarded as privileged for the radio station, even though
the official may in abuse of the occasion make some defamatory
utterance." 3
Somewhat similar questions may be presented in this country in
cases where government officials connected with the federal system of
iio. See, for example, the arguments set out in the report of the A. B. A. Com-
mittee on Communications in 1932, in criticism of the decision in the Sorensen case.
57 A. B. A. REP. 446-447 (1932) ; Guider, mspra note 24, at 7o8; Caldwell, in remarks
from the floor, before the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, 14 PRoc. A.
L. I. 162-164 (1937).
ii. See Hardgrove's remarks from the floor before the American Law Institute,
12 Paoc. A. L. I. 361 (935) ; Caldwell and Bohlen, in colloquy at Annual Meeting of
the American Law Institute, 14 id. at 163, 164 (937).
112. Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 6i, 74 P. (2d) 1127 (z938).
113. The American Law Institute recognizes such privilege for ultrahazardous
activity carried on in pursuance cf a public duty. RESTATEmENT, ToRTs (1938) § 52I.
In discussion before the American Law Institute, moreover, it was suggested by Pro-
fessor Bohlen, and specifically acquiesced in by Mr. Caldwell, that this principle would
be applicable to radio stations if and when a public duty to broadcast was thrust upon
them. I4 PRoc. A. L. I. 163-164 (I937).
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regulation of broadcasting seek the radio station's service. If it be
true that the station cannot refuse such requests for fear of a subse-
quent refusal to renew its license, then the practical situation is that
there is official compulsion to comply. If such official compulsion be
also legal, the elements for privilege for the radio station would seem
to be made out. Whether or not there may be public duty to broadcast
on some particular occasion may involve difficult and delicate questions.
If there is such a public duty, it would seem to follow that a correspond-
ing privilege attaches to the station.
3. Perspective for Privilege for Political Discussion by Radio
If no legal duty on the part of the station to broadcast can on the
particular occasion be made out, no reason is apparent why the radio
station should enjoy any greater privilege in the transmission of defam-
atory utterances than do the speakers given access to its microphone.
So far as political discussion is concerned, a considerable number of
jurisdictions now regard such discussion as conditionally privileged. In
such jurisdictions, accordingly, both speaker and radio station are condi-
tionally privileged. In the opinion of the present writer, such privilege
might well be recognized throughout the entire country.1 1 4  Possibly
the advent of national hookups in the broadcasting of political speeches
in national political campaigns may open the way for such general rec-
ognition of a conditional privilege for political speeches. Holding that
the radio station is not a publisher of the addresses of outside political
speakers given access to its microphone would be a sort of blind and
left-handed way of reaching the result that a privilege for the station
is in practical effect recognized. It would be unfortunate, however, to
express the reason for the result in such broad terms as to cover
all cases where outside advertisers are given access to the microphone.
There is no need, in order to recognize a privilege in the case
of political speeches, thus to establish a similar privilege for all defama-
tory advertising which is not put on the air by the radio station's own
announcer. It may be added that insofar as political speeches are not
already recognized as conditionally privileged, there is no reason why
the radio station may not for the protection both of itself and its
victims require indemnity from political speakers given access to its
microphone. Such, indeed, has already become familiar broadcasting
practice.115
114. The matter of political privilege is discussed at greater length in Vold, supra
note 15, at 637-639.
115. See notes 48 and 49 supra. During the campaign of 1938 a political speaker
in a radio broadcast referred to one of the local leaders in Omaha as "a gangster's law-
yer". An action was thereupon brought against the speaker and the broadcasting com-
pany, the plaintiff understanding the expression to have been "a gangster lawyer" and
so alleging in his pleadings. The speaker having provided the radio station with the
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It is apparent, therefore, that the same policy considerations are
applicable whether or not the political speech is previously submitted in
manuscript form, whether or not the defamatory utterance transmitted
is found in the manuscript or is interpolated by an outside political
speaker, and whether or not the process of transmission is in substance
automatic. In all these situations the danger and harm to the victim
are the same. In all these situations the broadcast is deliberately under-
taken with knowledge that chances are taken when outside speakers are
given access to the microphone. In all these situations the radio station
may require satisfactory indemnity before admitting the speaker to the
microphone. In all these situations the radio station is entitled to enjoy
any privilege that the law extends to the speaker himself. Every argu-
ment for extending political privilege to the radio station in jurisdictions
where it has not heretofore been recognized for political speakers would
seem to be equally applicable in favor of the speakers at the microphone.
It is therefore not apparent how arguments of this sort as a matter of
policy justify any special privilege to the radio station as distinct from
whatever privilege is available to the political speaker given access to
the microphone. On the other hand, security of reputation from defam-
atory utterances in the field of general commercial advertising requires
that courts should be wary of pronouncements of immunity to broad-
casting stations in broader terms than the nature of political privilege
itself requires.
IX. SIDELIGHTS FROM TAXATION CASES: Do RADIO STATIONS
"LEASE THEIR FACILITIES"?
The arguments in behalf of radio stations when liability for defa-
mation has been in question have persistently taken the direction that
the radio station by its mere operation of its apparatus is not a pub-
lisher."" In that view the speaker at the microphone is asserted to be
the publisher, and liability on the part of the radio station for the defam-
atory utterances of the speaker is claimed to rest only on some showing
of negligence on its part in permitting the defamatory broadcast by the
speaker. The argument has even assumed the phraseology that the
station merely supplies its machinery to the speaker, or leases its facil-
ities to him, and the station's activity has often been compared with that
of one who rents cars, printing presses or auditoriums.11 Giving the
transaction the name of a lease when outside speakers are given access
usual indemnity under his contract for time, and being "good" for it, the radio station
concerned itself very little over the matter but left the speaker, who uttered the words
into the microphone, to deal with the case as he saw fit. It is understood to be still
pending (Oct. 18, 1939).
x16. This argument is set out very elaborately in Brief for Appellant, pp. 35-61,
Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302 (Pa. 1939).
117. See supra notes 15, 68, 70.
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to the microphone is of course utterly fallacious, since in all broadcasts
the station operators are in charge and control the operation of the
transmission apparatus. In the defamation cases, however, it has
served the station's purpose of so describing the facts of their activities
as verbally to minimize their participation in the acts of transmission,
and thus lend support to the contention that the radio station is not a
publisher. While that view of the matter has up to now been generally
rejected by the courts, the same form of statement has been reasserted
as peculiarly and especially applicable to the facts of broadcasting at
least so far as defamatory interpolations are concerned." 8
At the same time that these arguments have been urged in behalf
of radio stations in cases involving defamatory utterances, precisely the
reverse of these arguments has been asserted in behalf of radio stations
where the effort has been to avoid liability for state occupation taxes
on the theory that radio broadcasting activity is interstate commerce.
The state authorities in order to show that the business was local have
asserted the same kind of argument as have been asserted on behalf of
the radio stations themselves in the defamation cases." 0  In these
occupation tax cases, however, as in the defamation cases, the opposite
view of the facts of broadcasting has prevailed. The matter was car-
ried to the Supreme Court of the United States, where it was held that
the radio station's operations of broadcasting constituted interstate
commerce. On the question of the radio station's active participation in
the process of transmission, as opposed to merely turning its machinery
over to the speaker at the microphone, the language of Justice Stone in
Fishers Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commission 120 is highly
significant:
"We may assume, although it is not alleged, that appellant's
customers produce the sounds which are broadcasted. But it suffi-
ciently appears . . . that appellant, and not the customer, gen-
erates the electric current and controls the apparatus (generator,
II8. See supra pp. 252-253.
II9. "Neither does respondent contend that its facilities are leased to anyone for
the purpose of conducting scientific experiments. It clearly appears from the complaint
that respondent's stations are used only for commercial broadcasting, and that branch
of the art is the only one with which we are here concerned.
"In so far as the conduct of its business affairs by respondent is concerned, it is all
purely intrastate. Its plants are entirely within the state of Washington; its contracts
provide only for the use of its stations and the recognized facilities thereof, including
their power to project electro-magnetic waves. Respondent completes its contracts
with its patrons when it turns over its stations to them or their agents, and it is none of
respondent's concern, as long as the stations function properly, where or by whom the
waves or vibrations which it causes to be released are received and transmitted into
sound." Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 182 Wash. 163, 170,
179, 45 P. (2d) 942, 945, 949 (1935). (Italics supplied.) See also Atlanta v. Ogle-
thorpe University, 178 Ga. 379, 383, 173 S. E. 110, 12 (1934).
120. 297 U. S. 650 (1936). The quotations in the text which'follow are from pp.
653 and 654.
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transmitter and their controls) by which the sounds are broad-
casted . . . These allegations, read in the light of the statute,
which forbids any save licensees to operate broadcasting apparatus
. . . and of the facts of which we have judicial knowledge
. . . must be taken to state that the broadcasting of radio emana-
tions, as distinguished from the production of the sounds broad-
casted, is effected by appellant and not by its customers.
"The sounds broadcasted are not transmitted from the micro-
phone to the ears of listeners in other states. They do not pass
as sound waves to the receiving mechanisms. They serve only to
enable the broadcaster, by the use of appropriate apparatus, to
modulate the radio emanations which he generates. These emana-
tions as modulated, are projected through space to the receiving
sets . . . On the argument it was conceded that, in broadcasting
for its customers, appellant, by generating the necessary electric
power and controlling the transmitter, produces the radio emana-
tions which actuate the receiving mechanisms located in other
states .
"Appellant is thus engaged in the business of transmitting
advertising programs from its station in Washington to those
persons in other states who 'listen in' through the use of receiving
sets. "
From the mere standopint of consistency, without going into other
aspects, one may well ask how radio stations in carrying on the broad-
casting business can at the same time be engaged in the business of
"transmitting advertising programs from its stations . . . to those
persons in other states who 'listen in' ", and yet not be transmitters of
the interpolations which are contained in and constitute parts of such
programs. So far as the operative facts of physical transmission are con-
cerned, as distinguished from policy considerations having a bearing
on privilege, all that Justice Stone has said here is as true of interpola-
tions as it is of the contents of manuscripts broadcast. It is as true
of interpolations as it is of the contents of submitted manuscripts that
"The sounds broadcasted are not transmitted from the microphone to
the ears of listeners . . . ." In neither case does the sound of the
words as uttered into the microphone "pass as sound waves to the receiv-
ing mechanisms". In both cases such sounds "serve only to enable the
broadcaster, by the use of appropriate apparatus, to modulate the radio
emanations which he generates". In both cases "These emanations as
modulated are projected through space to the receiving sets".
When the taxation cases and the defamation cases are viewed side
by side it is at once plain that the radio stations according to their inter-
ests in the particular case have urged upon the courts two diametrically
opposite and utterly inconsistent interpretations of the same physical
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facts of broadcasting. Manifestly these contradictory interpretations
of the facts cannot both be right. Either the radio station actually
performs the operations of broadcasting or it does not. It cannot be
true that the radio station merely turns over its apparatus to the speaker,
as contended in the defamation cases, if it is true, as contended
in the taxation cases, that it is the station which by its operations
is "engaged in the business of transmitting advertising programs
from its stations . . . to those persons in other states who
'listen in' through the use of receiving sets". In addition, the assertion
in the defamation cases that the radio station merely turns its machinery
over to the speaker in effect implies that the speaker at the microphone
is the real and true broadcaster who operates the broadcasting apparatus.
As to this point, it is not explained how such conduct can be lawful in
the face of the provision in the Radio Act which forbids any save
licensees to operate broadcasting apparatus. As a matter of fact, it is
not true that the radio station turns its machinery over to the speaker.
The operation and control of the broadcasting apparatus is throughout
in the hands of the radio station's own employees.
X. OTHER CONSPICUOUS CONTRADICTIONS IN ARGUMENTS ADDUCED
IN BEHALF OF RADIO STATIONS
A comparable contradiction in the arguments made in behalf of
radio stations appears when defamation cases are compared with rate
cases. In the defamation cases it has been unsuccessfully asserted as
the foundation for the claim of absolute privilege for the radio station
in political broadcasts that the broadcasting station was a common
carrier,121 and that under the Radio Act a duty was imposed to make
such broadcasts, a claim which, incidentally, is not maintainable. At
the same time, where the question was whether radio broadcasting rates
were subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission, it
was stoutly and successfully maintained by the radio interests that radio
broadcasting stations were not and could not be regarded as common
carriers under the law.
122
Another contradiction that has appeared in arguments advanced in
behalf of radio stations is so conspicuous as to deserve separate men-
tion. It has been insisted, on the one hand, that holding the radio station
subject to liability on the same general basis as newspapers involves
extremely great dangers to the radio station against which it cannot
protect itself even by the exercise of the utmost care. 123 On the other
I2r. See Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 358, 243 N. W. 82, 86 (1932).
122. Sta-Shine Products, Inc. v. Carman, 188 I. C. C. 271 (1932). In this aspect
the Commission upheld the contention of the radio interests that a radio broadcasting
station was not under a common carrier duty to render broadcasting service for anyone.
123. See, for instance, the works criticized in note 24 supra.
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hand, in answer to the suggestion that the victim of the defamatory
broadcast will be exposed to these same extreme dangers if liability is
relaxed, it is asserted that such danger is very slight indeed, and that
there is accordingly no social necessity for a stringent rule of liability.1
2 4
If it be actually true that the problem is of no serious importance, since
due care in the practical situations that arise generally affords ample
protection, why do radio stations attempt so intensely to overturn the
initial case law on the point? Verily, it makes all the difference in the
world whose ox is gored.
i24. See the last paragraph of note ioo mtpra.
